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1.1 Goal of this thesis
To indicate the question function of an utterance in natural dialogue, a speaker
may use different cues. For instance, the utterance may begin with a WH-word
(where, what, how, etc.) or an auxiliary verb (did, can, are, etc.) to indicate a
WH-question or a Yes~No-question; this is exemplified in (1) and (2), respectively.
(1) "What is a declarative question?"
(2) "Is this a declarative question?"
In such cases, the question function can be determined from syntactic cues. When
natural dialogues are actually examined, however, one may notice that many
questions asked in dialogues have the syntactic form of a statement, and do not
possess one of the overt cues mentioned above. These questions will be called
Declarative Questions (DQs). In example (3), the question function of a DQ is
indicated by a question-mark, which, in spoken dialogues, may correspond with
a rising intonation.
(3) "This is a declarative question?"
In natural dialogues, however, a DQ often lacks the final rise in intonation and,
although hearers usually have no problem in understanding its question function,
it is unknown which cues are used to disclose the function of the DQ.
The primary goal in this thesis is to recover how listeners in natural dialogues
identify the question function of a DQ and which information is conveyed by the
speaker if a declarative form is used instead of an interrogative one. More specifi-
cally, we will be concerned with the identification of the mental state of a speaker
in terms of beliefs and intentions from the linguistic features (prosodic and tex-
tual) and the circumstances (context) of the DQ. For that, we have opted for a
combination of empirical observations, experiments, and a theoretical approach:
empirical since we want to know what is actually going on in real discourse, ex-
perimental to manipulate the circumstances and to test the hypotheses that come
from the empirical observations, and finally theoretical to model the identifica-
tion process of the communicative function of an utterance and to develop formal
methods suitable for use in computer dialogue systems.
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The present research is primarily aimed at the field of speech act theory
(Austin (1962); Searle (1969)), although it has gained much from methods used
in different fields of linguistics, such as psycholinguistics and conversational anal-
yses. In speech act theory, the use of language is viewed as the performance
of
actions by a speaker to change certain aspects of the world. Examples of such
ac-
tions are `stating', `warning', `questioning', `promising', etc. In this thesis, speech
acts will be considered as special instances of communicative acts, i.e. acts that
are intentionally meant to transfer certain (linguistic) information. For
historical
reasons only, we will keep the term `speech act' here; in chapter 6, however, the
term `speech act' will be replaced by `communicative act' to refer explicitly
to
the conception of an act as a context-changing function (Gazdar (1981);
Bunt
(1989a)).
So, the empirical and experimental results will be used to support a better
understanding of speech acts, especially the relation between form and function
(here: `declarative' and `question', respectively) of the utterance in natural dia-
logue. This presupposes, for instance, that mental states should not be conceived
primarily as states in a psychological sense but rather as logical concepts, with
logical interrelations expressed in axiom schemes and rules of inference, to de-
scribe the conditions that must be fulfilled to perform a certain speech act.
To distinguish the syntactic form from the function of the utterance, we
will
use the syntactic features declarative and interrogative as opposed to the function
names statement and question, respectively. It will be presupposed that the
notion of `declarative' as a syntactic device is intuitively clear; no effort
will
be made to describe the morpho-syntactic characteristics of the declarative as
opposed to other sentence types, such as interrogative, imperative or exclamative.
1.2 Information dialogues
The type of conversation considered in the present research is restricted to dia-
logues. A dialogue in this thesis will be viewed as a real-time exchange of infor-
mation between two participants by means of linguistic tokens. By `real-time' we
mean that the time between two consecutive turns is relatively short, usually no
longer than a few minutes. This also includes keyboard dialogues, where people
sometimes take somewhat longer time to respond to their partner (see e.g., Beun
óc Bunt (1987)).
Here, the type of dialogue will be restricted to so-called information dialogues.
In information dialogues, participants behave in a rational and cooperative way
and have the sole purpose of transferring factual information (Bunt (1989b)). Ex-
amples are dialogues with information desks of airport services, railway stations
and task-oriented dialogues such as described in Grosz and Sidner (1986). The
motivation for choosing this type of dialogue is twofold:
"The scientific reason is that virtually any kind of dialogue depends
on the transfer of information. The study of information dialogues
is therefore basic to the study of dialogues in general. The practical
reason is that dialogues, purely motivated by the aim of transferring
factual information, are one of the most obvious forms of communi-
cation in natural language that make sense with a computer." (Bunt
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(1989b): pp. 423)
It was already mentioned that we want to know what is going on in real discourse.
Hence, we want to analyse utterances that people normally use in the circum-
stances of an information dialogue rather than made-up examples emanated from
the investigator's intuition. Taking material from real-life dialogues has two other
major advantages. Firstly, the problem of circularity can be avoided. That is, on
the one hand we would like to determine the question function from the character-
istics of the utterance and, on the other, we want to find out which characteristics
are important in determining the function. Since the function can be derived from
the discourse, we can simply pick out those utterances with a declarative sentence
type that function as questions in the dialogues, without bothering beforehand
about their characteristics. Secondly, contextual information usually plays an
essential role in determining the question function; the dialogues (discourse and
non-discourse context) enable us to determine what this information may be.
The dialogues considered in this thesis were taken from a laboratory experi-
ment where subjects had to determine by telephone departure and arrival times of
aircraft and trains from an informant at Schiphol airport (Beun (1985)). Before
we give a short overview of the research in the next section, an example of the
kind of investigated dialogue is shown in (4).1 Note that the italicized utterances
in lines 8, 10 and 15 are declarative questions and easily identifiable as such from
the discourse although no question-marks were added.
(4) I- information service, S- subject
l I: Schiphol Information.
2 S: Good afternoon. This is van I. in Eindhoven. I would
like to have some information about flights to Munich.
When can I fly there between now and next Sunday?
3 I: Let me have a look. Just a moment.
4 S: Yes.
5 I: O.K., there are three flights every day, one at nine
fifty,
6 S: Yes.
7 I: one at one forty and one at six twenty-five.
8 S: Six twenty-f ive . These all go to Munich
9 I: These all go to Munich.
10 S: And that's on Saturday too
11 I: And that's on Saturday too, yes.
12 S: Right. Do you also have information about the
connections to Schiphol by train?
13I: Yes, I do.
'The example is taken from Bunt (1989b); tlie English translation is a junction of
different dialogues and used to accentuate the occurrence of declarative questions in this
type of dialogue. The original Dutch transcriptions tiave been collected in Prust, Minnen
8L Beun (1984).
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14 S: Do you know how long the train ride takes to Schiphol?
15 I: You are travelling from Eindhoven
16 S: That's right.
17 I: It's nearly two hours to Amsterdam. You can change
there and then it's another fifteen minutes, so you
should count on some two and a half hours.
18 S: O.K. Thank you.
19I: You're welcome.
20 S: Bye.
21 I: Bye .
1.3 Thesis outline
In the next chapter, we will concentrate on certain issues about the identification
of speech acts and communicative acts in general. Uttering sentences will be
viewed as the intentional performance of actions to achieve a certain goal of the
speaker. To some extent, communication is based on the notion of convention-
ality, i.e. a listener may infer from certain conventional syntactic or semantic
structures of the utterance the function of the utterance. Also, a speaker may
use mutually known protocols applied to cooperative dialogues to communicate
information (e.g., the cooperation principle as formulated by Grice (1975)). From
the identification of communicative acts in general, we will descend to the more
specific case of the identification of questions.
In the following chapters we will concentrate on declarative questions. In
chapter 3, two experiments are described where subjects had to identify the
question function from tape-recorded utterances. The first experiment was an
exploratory investigation to give an impression of the main characteristics of
DQs. DQs, isolated from the earlier recorded telephone dialogues, were mixed
with isolated answers from the same dialogues. In the second experiment, poten-
tial question indicators of the DQs were removed by computer and the original
and edited utterances were both presented to the subjects so that the influence
of the removal of these indicators could be investigated.
A disadvantage of removing textual indicators from the speech signal is that
prosodic features are removed as well. To eliminate prosodic characteristics and
to concentrate on textual indicators only, an experiment is described in chapter
4 where the subjects had to identify a DQ from screen. In contrast with the pre-
vious experiments, the responses of the subjects could not be directly compared
with real-life utterances, since the utterances were only based on the declarative
questions from the original dialogues.
In chapter 5, an experiment is described where the influence of contextual
features was tested on the use of DQs in a dialogue situation. Dialogues, taken
from transcriptions of the earlier conversations, were presented on paper to sub-
jects and information with respect to the semantic content of the questions was
manipulated in three ways: 1. the information could be derived from the previous
text literally or by implication, 2. the information was derivable from pragmatic
inferences (implicatures) or 3. the information was not derivable at all from the
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previous text. In the experiment, one group of subjects had to indicate preference
for a declarative or an interrogative form of the question; another group had to
judge the speaker's certainty about the semantic content of the declarative.
In chapter 6, a theoretical framework is sketched to identify the beliefs and in-
tentions of a speaker from the linguistic features of the utterance. The framework
is based on an application of hierarchically ordered default rules. By such rules, a
preferred interpretation of an utterance can be given in terms of relevant aspects
of the mental state of the speaker. A preferred interpretation can be rejected in
cases of inconsistency due to contextual knowledge of the hearer. In those cases,
a hearer may turn to a less preferred interpretation. For instance, a declarative
is interpreted as a statement unless contextual evidence says otherwise. In the
latter case, a declarative may be interpreted as a question, or, more specifically,
a verification. The framework was worked out in such a manner that contextual
information and some results of the experiments could be incorporated.
6 Chapter 1
Chapter 2
The identification of inental
states
2.1 Introduction
Since speech acts are considered as instances of communicative acts (CAs), they
will also inherit characteristics from CAs. Here, CAs will be considered as actions
intentionally performed to transfer certain information from an actor (speaker)
to an observer (hearer) and as parts of a plan to change certain aspects of the
world. For instance, if an actor wants to make inquiries by phone about the
departure time of his plane to San Francisco, he has to develop a plan to obtain
the relevant information. The plan consists of a number of actions some of whích
may be communicative: he has to find out the right phone number, call the
information desk, talk to the informant, etc. (see e.g., Pollack (1989)).
Intentions play a fundamental role in human communication. Not only are
CAs intentionally performed to transfer certain information, CAs are also per-
formed in the Gricean sense of non-natural meaning (meaning-nn: Grice (1957)),
i.e.:
An actor meant-nn a by doing a certain CA iff:
the actor intended the CA to cause some effect c~ in the
observer by means of the recognition of that intention.
So, the action of scratching your nose may be performed intentionally to relieve
the itch; however, only when the action is intentionally performed to cause a
certain effect in the observer by recognizing that intention will we speak of the
(non-natural) meaning of a certain action. For instance, in a card game, if the
scratching is performed to cause the effect that the observer knows that the actor
has a good card, the meaning of the scratching is the intention that the observer
recognizes that the action is performed to communícate that the actor has a good
card.
Now, an important question to be answered is how the observable features of
the CA (such as body movements, words, etc.) can be related to aspects of the
actor's mental state. In other words, how does an observer recognize from the
actor's behaviour the intended information transfer? Here, we have two options.
Firstly, the observer may infer relevant parts of the actor's mental state from
knowledge of a convention that a particular behaviour has a certain meaning. In
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that case, the meaning can be derived from the behaviour itself. Secondly, the
meaning of someone's behaviour can be inferred from situational characteristics.
The same behaviour may have different meanings in different situations and, on
the other hand, different behaviour may have the same meaning in the same
situation. For instance, the act of raising a hand may count as a`greeting' in
one context, and an `appeal for help' in another. And the act of
pointing at
the salt cellar may have the same meaning in the same context as asking "Can
you pass me the salt?" . So, to derive the intended information transfer from
an actor's behaviour, we have to describe at least (1) the actor's behaviour,
(2) conventions regarding the meaning of a certain behaviour and (3) particular
contextual aspects.
To infer the meaning of a certain act, we will concentrate in this chapter
on both the behaviour of the actor and some contextual constraints. Since
we
only consider actions that are intentionally performed, we will first discuss how
intentions should be understood in this thesis. Next, we will elucidate what we
mean by the concepts of cooperation and rationality. And finally, we will narrow
the type of act to linguistic acts and focus attention on speech act theory. In
particular will we discuss various features that may support a question interpre-
tation of the utterance. The features of the act in terms of prosodics, lexical
items and sentence structure of the utterance may be conceived as a particular
behaviour of the actor. Rules of cooperation and rationality are supposed to
be
perennial information and may therefore be understood as contextual knowledge
of the actor.
2.2 Intentions
In both Allwood (1976) and Bratman (1989), a distinction is made between
intentions that are connected to actions and intentions that are connected to
mental states. For instance, an agent may intentionally pick up the phone and he
may have the intention to be in San Francisco in the future. In the former case
the intention characterizes the action, i.e. the action is purposefully performed to
achieve a certain state. In the latter case, the intention characterizes the agent's
mental state, i.e. the agent's commitment to achieve a certain desired world.
What is important here is that the first intention indicates that the action is
part of a plan to achieve an intended state and that the second intention can be
considered as a conduct-controlling attitude to direct behaviour towards a certain
end. In what follows, we will mainly be concerned with the latter, although it will
be assumed that all actions considered in this thesis are performed intentionally.
Intention should be carefully distinguished from consciousness and desires of
an actor. We will assume that some actions that are part of a plan may be
carried out consciously, other actions less so or even unconsciously. However, all
actions are carried out intentionally and are therefore part of a plan to achieve
an intended state. For instance, the actor does not have to be conscious of
the way he picks up the phone or how to move his fingers to dial the number,
although these actions are carried out intentionally, i.e. to achieve the primary
goal to know the departure time of the plane. In the same way a speaker is not
conscious of the way he pronounces words or how he `adds' certain intonation
patterns to his utterances, although the utterances are performed intentionally.
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We will assume that the identification of someone's intentions does not depend
on his consciousness.
Cohen 8c Levesque (1989a) argue that intentions are related to desires of an
agent but are not reducible to them. An agent may have competing desires;
intentions, by contrast, are always consistent, i.e. an agent believes that the
state resulting from the performance of his intended actions is a reachable state.
For instance, the agent cannot have the intention to be at two different places at
the same time. However, an agent may have the desire to be at both places at
the same time. Loosely speaking, an agent chooses a certain desired state and his
decision commits him to execute certain actions to achieve that state. In other
words, intentions make the actor act. Henceforward, we will call the final state
to be achieved the óasic intention of the actor.
2.3 Cooperative behaviour and intentions
The basic intention of an agent, which corresponds with the intended final result
of the agent's plan, is usually difficult to discover. A hearer may recognize the
basic intention if a speaker expresses himself extremely precisely or completely
(which hardly ever happens in conversations) or when the context is sufficiently
restrictive to recognize the intention (e.g., when two people know each other very
well~. Fortunately, the basic intention need not be recognized in most cases. Let
us take an example to clarify this.
In a dialogue with an information desk at Amsterdam airport, the information
seeker asks what time the plane leaves to New York. Actually, the speaker's basic
intention is to go to San Francisco, but he thinks that one should take the plane
to New York first. The answer of the informant depends on what he knows about
the belief and basic intention of the speaker and his knowledge about the planes
to San Francisco and New York. The informant may just answer the question,
without paying attention to what the questioner actually wants. The informant is
only more cooperative when he helps the questioner on the way to San Francisco,
for instance, when the informant knows that there is an easier way to get there.l
Cooperation can be seen as a way of acting such that an agent intentionally
helps to fulfill the goals of his partner. In Grice (1975), general principles under-
lying the efficient cooperative use of language of rational agents are identified.
The so-called cooperative principle is expressed as follows:
"Make your contribution such as required, at the stage at which it
occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in
which you are engaged" (pp. 45)
Next, four categories of more specific maxims and submaxims are distinguished
that yield results in accordance with the cooperative principle:
1. The maxim of quality
Try to make your contribution one that is true, specifically:
lIn designing natural language dialogue systems the minimal cooperation required is
that the systeni answers a question literally or executes a conunand, but, as may be clear
from the utterance "Delete all information from your data base", the system cannot be
cooperative in all cases.
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(i) do not say what you believe to be false
(ii) do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence
2. The maxim of quantity
(i) Make your contribution as informative as is required for the current
purpose of the exchange
(ii) Do not make your contribution more informative than is required
3. The maxim of relevance
Make your contribution relevant
4. The maxim of manner
Be perspicuous, specifically:
(i) avoid obscurity in the expression
(ii) avoid ambiguity
(iii) be brief (avoid unnecessary prolixity)
(iv) be orderly
Grice suggests that the maxims are not arbitrary conventions but rather describe
rational means for conducting cooperative exchanges and therefore have their
analogues in rational cooperative non-linguistic behaviour.
In chapter 6 of this thesis the maxims of quantity and quality are expressed in
terms of intentions and beliefs of the speaker. The importance of the maxims in
our case is that from the knowledge about the way agents use language, listeners
can make inferences about the mental state of the speaker. For instance, if a
speaker makes a statement and he acts cooperatively, the hearer knows that the
speaker believes the content of the statement. Or, if a speaker asks a question,
a hearer can infer by means of the quantity and~or relevance maxim that the
speaker wants to know certain information.
The first quantity maxim also enables a hearer to supply more information
than is actually asked for, since the current goal is taken into account. This may
happen, for instance, when the hearer knows the basic intention of the speaker,
although the speaker did not express this intention. For instance, if a speaker
asks "Can you pass the salt?" , a hearer will interpret the utterance primarily as
a request to pass the salt and not as a question concerning the hearer's physical
abilities (although both readings may be available). So, from the fact that an
actor acts purposefully and behaves cooperatively, inferences can be generated
that go beyond the semantic content of the utterances; the inferences are called
implicatures.
Sufficient restriction of the situation enables the hearer to infer relevant parts
of the mental state from the speaker's actions. Here, we should be careful, though,
because there is a snake in the grass. Specifically, how should the speaker's action
be described? Previously, we used the examples `statement' and `question', but,
since speakers hardly ever explicitly mention these functions, the hearer has to
find the information from other features in the utterance. So, before the action
can be determined, we have to describe the observable features conventionally
tied to a certain actíon. In what follows, we will concentrate on the recognition
of speech acts, more specifically of questions, and keep in mind that all features
can be overruled by contextual aspects. First, we will briefly introduce some
general aspects and terminology of speech act theory.
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2.4 Speech act theory
In speech act theory (Austin (1962); Searle (1969)), it is assumed that utterances
not only can be assigned a truth value, but that utterances also change the world
by doing something. For instance, declaratives like:
"I warn you that this dog will bite"
"I promise you to come"
"I ask you to leave"
"I hereby pronounce you man and wife"
do not describe a certain state of affairs, but are used to perform certain actions.
Such sentences and their main verbs are called performatives and performative
verbs, respectively. Although the sentences cannot be true or false, they can
be infelicitous,2 i.e. certain conditions can be absent that must be met before
the performative can be successfully carried out. These conditions are called the
felicity conditions, i.e. the necessary conditions to perform a certain act. In many
cases, performatives can only be performed felicitously if particular institutional
arrangements are present. Not only must the speaker have certain beliefs and
intentions, the circumstances must also be appropriate. Simply saying "I hereby
christen the ship New Magic Breeze" cannot count as naming a ship without
the presence of a ship, a bottle of champagne, witnesses, an appropriate person
chosen to name it, etc.
Austin claimed that, in uttering a sentence, three kinds of acts are simulta-
neously performed: the locutionary, the illocutionary and the perlocutionary act.
The locutionary act is the production of a sentence with a particular sense and
reference.3 The illocutionary act is the performance of a certain act by virtue of
the conventional force associated with it, e.g., `stating', `promising', `warning',
etc. The perlocutionary act, is what is achieved by performing the act, i.e. the
bringing about of certain effects on the listener, such as `convincing', `scaring',
etc.
The focus of Austin's theory lies in the second act, which is also called the
speech act. With every illocutionary act, an illocutionary force can be associated
that explicitly names the type of act performed. For instance, if, in the appro-
priate circumstances, a speaker utters the sentence "The dog is in the house" ,
the illocutionary force may be: `stating' or `warning'; the perlocutionary effects
may be: `convincing' or `scaring'. The illocutionary acts are supposed to be
conventional and the perlocutionary acts are specific to the circumstances of
the utterance. However, there are certain problems associated with the
word
`conventional', since the illocutionary forces above are not independent of the
circumstances, and the only cases where we can speak of a conventional force are
the institutionalized performatives like `christening', `declaring', etc. Another
problem is that declaratives cannot simply be tied to statements, interrogatives
to questions and imperatives to orders or reyuests and it is certainly not clear
2It can be arguecl, however, that these sentences are true after they are uttered and
false before. But even when this is so, it is obvious that the world has changed.
'Actually, Austiu distinguishes the phonetic act (i.e. the act of making sound}, the
phn.tic act (i.e. uttering worcl~ with a certaiu gramniar and intonation) ancl the
rhetic
o.ct (uttering a senteuce with certain sense and reference}.
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how other utterance features can be linked to the actual illocutionary act per-
formed. We will return to this problem later on.
A second important contribution to the theory of speech acts comes from
Searle
(1969). Searle's account of speech act theory can be considered as an
elaboration
of Austin's work, especially on the felicity conditions (FCs~ of the
illocutionary
act. Although Searle accepts the same terminology, he does not
distinguish in
the same way between the illocutionary and locutionary act. Searle
takes the
term propositional act as referring to Austin's act of referring and
predicating.
Now, the illocutionary act is rewritten as a function, the illocutionary
force, and
its argument, the propositional content. For instance, the utterance
"Is John
sleeping?" may have the force of `questioning' and the content `SLEEP(John)';
the illocutionary act is represented as `Question(SLEEP(John))'.
Searle suggests a classification of FCs into four types: propositional content,
preparatory, sincerity and essential conditions. Let us clarify the classification
with an example: the illocutionary act of `questioning' (Searle (1969~: pp.
66).
S - speaker, H - hearer
Propositional content: can be any proposition or propositional
function
Preparatory: 1. S does not know the answer
2. It is not obvious to both S and H that H
will provide the information at that time
without being asked
Sincerity: S wants the information
Essential: Counts as an attempt to elicit the informa-
tion from H
Searle argues that there are two kinds of questions, a. real questions and b. exam
questions; in the first the speaker wants to find out the answer and in the latter
the speaker wants to find out whether the listener knows the answer. Note that
in the latter case, the first preparatory condition would not be fulfilled, hence,
either the conditions are too restrictive or the exam question is no real question
in Searle's view.
In this thesis, a question is primarily taken as a signal from a speaker to
a
hearer that the speaker wants certain information. To some extent, this defini-
tion agrees with a combination of Searle's sincerity and essential conditions
on
questioning. In Searle's essential condition it is explicitly mentioned that the
question should be seen as an attempt to elicit information from H. In our
view,
the information may come from anywhere, but will most likely come from
H,
because H acts cooperatively, and the speaker is aware of H's cooperative be-
haviour. Note that in the case of the exam question, the speaker explicitly wants
the information to come from the hearer. This situation, though, falls outside
the scope of the information dialogue. In chapter 6, we will see that the
first
preparatory condition can be inferred from rules of rational behaviour combined
with the sincerity condition. Levinson (1983) also suggests that the FCs will
probably follow from general considerations of cooperation and rationality.
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In line with Cohen óc Levesque (1989b), we will take the view that illocu-
tionary forces need not be explicitly recognized by a hearer. This may sound
contradictory, as this thesis is about the identification of questions. However,
illocutionary forces will be considered as labels of parts of the speaker's mental
state. The hearer only has to identify the speaker's beliefs and intentions from
the observable properties of the utterance, such as `declarative', `rising intona-
tion', etc., and may omit the explicit determination of the illocutionary force
in terms of performative verbs. The speaker's mental state will be expressed in
terms of sets of propositions qualified by the attitudes `Belief' (B) and `Intention'
(I), built into a logical framework with the appropriate axioms. An important
advantage of this approach is that the Gricean maxims can be brought within the
logical framework and that the felicity conditions are not linked to a particular
illocutionary force but are subject to general rules of rationality and cooperative
behaviour.
Illocutionary acts will be considered in a Searlean sense, i.e. the application
of the illocutionary force as a function to its argument, the propositional content.
For that reason, the term `illocutionary force' will, in most cases, be replaced
by `communicative function' (CF), and also `illocutionary act' will be replaced
by `communicative act' to refer to the conception of an action intentionally per-
formed to change certain aspects of the world (see also Bunt (1989a)).
2.4.1 The identification of speech acts
Turning now to the identification of an illocutionary act, we should consider the
conventions to express a certain act. It should be noted, though, that we are
not concerned with what is linguistically correct, since the data discussed in the
following chapters comes from human behaviour in dialogues, not from what
linguists consider as correct or relevant conventional usage.
The most overt linguistic indicator of the illocutionary force is the (sincere)
use of an explicit performative,4 like:
"I hereby ask you what time it is"
"I hereby confirm my reservations"
"I hereby check whether John has gone"
However, explicit performatives are seldom used. Austin discusses other features,
apart from situational aspects, that may also indicate a particular illocutionary
force:
Mood: By mood Austin refers to what we will call sentence type, e.g., `declar-
ative', `interrogative' and `imperative'. Some examples are:5
sentence type example illocutionary force
Declarative "John drinks beer" statement
Interrogative "Does John drink beer" question
Imperative "Drink beer, John" order
'The explicit performative is not decisive in all cases. For instance, in the appropri-
ate circumstances, the utterance "1 promise you that I will return" can be meant as a
`warning', and not as a sincere act of `promising'.
~For a discussion on the relation between sentence type and illocutionary force, see
e.g., Geukens (1986).
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Tone of voice, cadence, emphasis: Henceforth, these features will be called
`prosodics'. In written language they may be replaced by punctuation, ital-
ics, etc. One has to be careful, though, especially in transcriptions of spoken
dialogues, where question-marks often indicate the utterance' function, and
not its prosodic characteristics. Some examples are:
prosodics example ill. force
final fall "There is a dog in the house." statement
final rise "There is a dog in the house?" question
accentuation "There is a DOG in the house!" warning
Connecting particles: Austin discusses some particles that may replace the
use of an explicit performative. For instance, the particle `still' indicates `I
will insist that'; `therefore' and `so' indicate `I conclude that', etc.
Accompaniments of the utterance: Utterances may be accompanied by
non-verbal phenomena, like gestures (winks, pointing, frowning, etc.) or
ceremonial non-verbal activities.
2.4.2 The identification of questions
In Clark dz Clark (1977) the following syntactic strategy is described to identify
the function of a clause in a sentence from its first constituent:
"Use the first word (or major constituent) of a clause to identify the
function of that clause in the current sentence." (pp. 68)
So, if the main clause begins with a WH-word, it is a WH-question. Whenever
a clause begins with an auxiliary verb (in English) it is a Yes~No-question. An
exception of the WH-word is formed by `exclamatives', like "What a beautiful
launderette he has!" ; in such cases, however, the clause has no subject-verb inver-
sion. However, the following examples can hardly be considered as sincere acts
of questioning:
(1) "What did you say? Peter crashed my car. I can't believe it."
It is not difficult to find other counter-examples where the main clause starts
with an auxiliary:
(2) "Don't I know what a carburettor is? I'll teach you."
(3) "May I remind you that we have to leave early?"
(4) "Didn't you forget to close the door?"
In (1) and (2) the speaker does not fulfill any of the felicity conditions suggested
by Searle and the question can be interpreted as rhetorical. In (3) the speaker
asks literally whether he ma,y remind the hearer that they have to leave early.
However, the speaker does not await the answer, hence the sincerity and the
essential conditions are not fulfilled (see also Levinson (1983)). And the utterance
in (4) may simply count as an indirect request by the speaker to close the door.
We may hope that in spoken dialogues information about the question func-
tion of the utterance comes from prosodics. However, this hope is often vain.
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Geluykens (1988) has shown that (at least in British English) in many cases
intonation is not used to distinguish sincere questions from interrogatives with-
out question status. Even in cases where a declarative sentence type was used
(DQs), a falling intonation pattern was by far the most frequent pattern (68~).
Our findings confirm this for Dutch. Hence, it is to be expected that a simple
form-force correlation does not exist and that the utterances' function is heavily
influenced by contextual features.
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Chapter 3
The auditory recognition of
declarative questions
R.J. Beun
~A slightly revised version of this chapter was accepted in: Taylor, M.M., Néel,
F. ê4 Bouwhuis, D.G. (Eds.~ (1989~ The structure of multimodal dialogue. Am-
sterdam: North Holland~
abstract
In this paper two experiments are presented on the recognition of questions witll a declar-
ative sentence type (DQs) in Dutch. DQs were isolated froln previously recorded tele-
phone dialogues and mixed with answers. In the first experiment subjects had to deter-
nline from audio tape the functioli (answer or question) of the isolated utterallces. The
second experimellt was carried out to determine tlle illdicators which played a decisive
role in the responses of the subjects. To this end, possible question indicators were re-
moved from the utterances and subjects were asked to perform the same task as in the
pI-evious experilllent. It followed that ilnportant question indicators were given by the
praglnatic particles sucll as en (and) alld dus (so). A substantial part of the questions iII
isolation could Ilot be labelled with the correct functioll; it is concluded t11at identification
in the original dialogues often }lad t0 cOIlle from contextual knowledge.
3.1 Introduction
In general it is assumed that questions in natural language are represented by
sentences with an interrogative sentence type (example la).1 In natural dialogues,
however, one finds many utterances with a declarative sentence type which clearly
fulfill the function of a question.2 Sometimes these utterances have clear cues to
indicate this function, e.g. the use of special words ( example lb~ or, as indicated
by the question mark in ( lc), a rising intonation at the end of the utterance in
spoken language:
'Following C,a.zdar ( 1981) we will regard sentence type as a purely syntactic charac-
teristic of sentences.
2Here an utterance sltould be taken in the sense of a sentence paired with a context
(see e.g. Levinson (1cJ83): pp. 18-19, or Gazdar ( 1981)).
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(la) "Are you invited to the party?" (interrogative)
(lb) "So, you are invited to the party." (declarative)
(lc) "You are invited to the party?" (declarative)
Although we will not consider the exact contribution of the indicators
to the
function, one can roughly say that the word so in (lb) and the
combination of
declarative sentence type and rising intonation in (lc) not only seem to
express
the question as in (la) but also a speaker's supposition about the
answer.
In many cases clear indicators are absent and the determination of the func-
tion seems to come from contextual cues only. The recognition of questions (and
of course answers) is of crucial importance for a proper continuation of the
dia-
logue; so we would like to find special characteristics in the utterance which could
indicate its question function even in the absence of contextual cues.
We will use the theoretical framework of Bunt's communicative
acts (Bunt
(1989a)). In doing so we have restricted ourselves to so-called information
dti-
alogues in which the participants have no other purpose than the exchange
of
factual information. A communicative act is determined by the
combination of
its semantic content and its communicative function (CF). This function
stipu-
lates the role of the semantic content in the dialogue and relates it to the
speaker's
knowledge and goals. The CF of the utterances in (lb) and (lc) for example is a
CHECK with semantic content INVITED(H,party) where H is the hearer
of the
utterance. In terms of knowledge and goals the preconditions of these
utterances
are respectively:
(2a) S wants to know whether INVITED(H,party)
(2b) S suspects (or knows) that H knows whether INVITED(H,party)
(2c) S suspects that INVITED(H,party)
In this paper we present an experimental study of questions with a declarative
sentence type in natural dialogues. Subsequently, two experiments were carried
out to find out whether subjects are able to recognize the CF of utterances de-
tached from the context. The utterances were obtained in previous dialogue
experiments which will not be considered here (see Beun (1985)).3 As discourse
situation we used the information exchange by telephone4 concerning arrival and
departure times of planes and trains at Schiphol (Amsterdam airport). The dia-
logues will be called `Schiphol dialogues'.
3.2 The corpus of utterances
All utterances investigated in this paper are declarative questions (DQs),
i.e.
questions, but with a declarative sentence type. Both complete
and elliptical
3Dutch speakiug subjects had to determine by telephone the departure
and arrival
times of airplanes and trains from an informant at. Schiphol
airport. The informant was
simulated by a well-trained person. Each subject read eight
sets of instructions to tell
them what kind of information had to be obtained.
sHere we avoid non-verbal aspects of communication which are difficult to
measure
such as eye-contact, body-inovement, etc.; so everything can be collected
from the original
speech signal.
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utterances are considered. Since in the case of elliptical utterances it is difficult
and sometimes impossible to determine the sentence type, only those instances
with clear interrogative or imperative features were excluded from the corpus.
To determine if an utterance is a question, even in the absence of syntactic
indications, the following definition is used:
DEF An utterance U is a declarative question if:s
a. The sentence type of the sentence expressed by U is declarative (or if the
sentence is elliptical the sentence type is at least non-interrogative and
non-imperative).
b. The utterance U, uttered by S, is about a topic on which S believes that H
is the expert.
c. S believes that S and H mutually believe that H is the expert on the topic.~
Note that we have excluded sentences as:
(3~ "I want to know what time it is"
(4) "Can you tell me what time it is"
The reason is that (3) is not a direct question as far as the literal interpretation
is involved: in (3) the literal topic is the goal of the speaker, who is the expert
on his own goals. (4) is excluded because of its interrogative sentence type.
In many cases where a matrix sentence contains a performative verb in the
second person, past tense, the definition is satisfied,7 e.g.:
(5) "You said that the plane will leave at ten"
(6) "You stated that the Germans will win"
For, in the restricted domain we use here, the addressee knows best what he has
said, stated, etc. The same can be said about epistemic or doxastic verbs in the
second person, present or past tense, e.g.:
(7) "You mean that I have to leave at ten"
(8) "You think that I'm joking"
Again, the addressee knows best what he means, thinks, etc. In the next sentence,
however, it is not clear what the CF is without contextual knowledge:
SThe interpretation of sentences defined by DEF as a question also agrees with tlie
maxim of quantity, for if the addressee knows more about the subject than the speaker
(and this is mutually believed) tlie utterance would be superfluous in the case of a
statement.
~`S and H inutually believe that p-(q) S and H believe that p and that q'. See also
Clark and Marshall (1981).
'In special circumstances one can use these fonus to focus certain aspects of an ad-
dressee's knowledge or actions to introduce for instance counterexamples, e.g.:
"You statecl that indirect speech acts caii be explained by means of felicity
conditions, but how then do you explain the utterance "It's cold inside" as
a request to close the window."
We did not encounter any of these examples in our restricted domain.
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(9) "The train leaves at 12.00"
Uttered by an informant in the dialogue experiments the CF can be an answer,
uttered by one of the subjects the CF can be a DQ,8 even without a rising
intonation at the end. In fact only 48010 (37 out of 77) of the DQs which appeared
in the dialogue experiments had a rising intonation.
DEF is largely based on contextual characteristics such as topic and mu-
tual belief. We expected however that certain characteristics of the utterances
(prosodic or textual) could indicate the CF without the use of context. From a
linguistic angle one can think of the use of special words such as so, thus, etc.9
Prosodic cues could for instance be given by intonation, accentuation or declina-
tion. To find out whether these indicators contribute to the interpretation of the
CF we carried out the experiments described in the following sections.
3.3 The first experiment
From the Schiphol dialogues we isolated 77 declarative questions (DQs).10 Forty
seven utterances were excluded from the experiment because the `DQ indicators'
were so clear that it was feared that the subjects would only pay attention to
these clear cases to distinguish the CF.11 These clear indicators were: 1. rising
intonation at the end of the utterance (37 utterances), 2. the use of Dutch
particles such as: hè, toch, zeker (13 utterances) and 3. the use of special verbs
as described in the previous section (6 utterances). Some utterances possessed
two or more of these indicators. The remaining 30 DQs were mixed with 24
answers, which were also taken from the Schiphol dialogues.
The task of the subjects was divided into two parts; in one part they had
to indicate for each utterance whether it was a question or not (question
task),
in the other part they had to say whether the utterance was an
answer or not
(answer task).12 The subjects did not know (before and after the
experiment)
that in both cases the same utterances were used.
This first experiment was only meant to give a rough indication about the
ability of subjects to recognize the CF in general, so only six Dutch subjects (of
both sexes, all over 18) took part in the first experiment. They had to write down
their responses on paper and they could think about their responses as long as
they wanted.
Before we discuss the results we will introduce some abbreviations. To dis-
tinguish the original CF (known from the context) from the responses given by
the subjects we will always write the first one in capital letters. The responses of
the subjects will be divided into 4 parts:
(yes)question: the utterance is interpreted as a question in the question task.
BStrictly speaking a DQ is not a communicative function because it contains
syntactic
information; this characterization is only maintained for the sake of simplicity.
~In Dutch these particles a.re widely used in natural dialogues, e.g. wel, toch, dus, en,
ook, etc.
"'We had no problems with interruptions becau,e the voices of the inforinant
and the
subject were recorded on different tracks. (TEAC A3440 4-channel siinul-sync)
"At this moment this is just a supposition and still has to be tested.
12Actually the subjects also had to answer whether the utterance was
an `inforin'
(Dutch: `mededeling'). We did not investigate these results, so they are
omitted.
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(no)question: the utterance is interpreted as not being a question in the ques-
tion task.
(yes)answer: the utterance is interpreted as an answer in the answer task.
(no)answer: the utterance is interpreted as not being an answer in the answer
task.
If the subjects agreed in more than 90qo of the cases on a question as CF of
an utterance (percentage of both (yes)questions and (no)answers ~ 90q), the
utterances were called `Q-utterances'. Conversely if the subjects agreed on an
answer in more than 90q, the utterances were called `A-utterances'. (Note that
this has nothing to do with the original CF.) Responses are called `inconsistent'
if a subject interpreted the same utterance as (yes)answer and (yes)question or
as (no)answer and (no)question.
3.4 Results
70q (199 out of 285)13 of the ANSWERs and 69~ (242 out of 351) of the DQs
were correctly identified. (Note that 50q would be purely random.) By `correctly
identified' we mean that, if the utterance was a DQ, the subjects responded:
(yes)question and (no)answer, and vice versa if the utterance was an ANSWER.
11~ of the ANSWERs and 12~ of the DQs were identified inconsistently, so there
were no striking differences between the ANSWERs and DQs.
These results do not look very spectacular. When we consider every utterance
separately, however, some interesting results appear. Table 3.1 shows the number
of utterances as a function of the CF and the percentage of correct responses per
utterance. The maximum number of correct responses per utterance is 12, i.e.
the total number of responses of the subjects per utterance in both answer and
question task.
Table 3.1: Number of utterances as a function of the original CF and
the percentage correct responses per utterance.
correct responses per utterance
DQ







From Table 3.1 it can be seen that 19 (17 -~ 2) DQs were not correctly identified,
which agrees almost 25~ of the total number of DQs in the dialogues. Also, in 19
(11 -~ 8) cases the subjects could almost perfectly identify the CF (both DQ and
ANSWER), in 3(2 f 1) cases the CF is inverted (ANSWER -~ Q-utterance, DQ
~ A-utterance) and in 32 (17f15) cases the subjects could hardly identify the CF.
"In some cases sub~ects did not make auy decision at all, so the total numbers of
ANSWERs ai~d DQs differ from 12 x 24 - 288 and 12 x 30 - 360 respectively.
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Note that the first and the last column, i.e. the percentage of correct responses
) 90o-Io and c 10070, respectively, shows the number of Q- and A-utterances.
But how do subjects identify the Q- and A-utterances? In other words, what
special characteristics do these utterances have to reveal the CF? To discover
this, all Q- and A-utterances were analysed on intonation patterns but no special
differences appeared between these utterances.14 However, there seemed to
be
an important difference in the use of special words. Almost all Q-utterances
contained particles like en ( and)15 at the beginning of the utterance, dus (so),
ook (also), etc. These words were missing in the A-utterances. In Table 3.2 the
occurrence of special words is shown for the Q- and A-utterances. Uncertainty
was expressed by words as ongeveer, pak em beet, etc. (about, roughly, etc.) or
the pause-particle uh.
Table 3.2: Occurrence of indicators as a function of Q-and
A-utterances
indicator I
dus en ~ ook uncertainty ~
Q-utterance 5', 6~, 4 4
~ A-utterance~Ó 0~ 0 I 2~
Note that in Table 3.2 the use of Q- and A-utterances, instead of DQ and AN-
SWER, implies that the subjects agreed in more than 90q on the interpretation
of the CF, and does not imply that the subject's responses were correct.
These indicators can also be used in answers; so we had the impression that
prosodic aspects also contributed to the interpretation of the CF. In the second
experiment, described in the next section, these linguistic indicators were removed
from the utterances.
3.5 The second experiment
In the second experiment we used the following utterances (total 33) from
the
previous one:
1. all Q-utterances (11 utterances)
2. all A-utterances (8 utterances)
3. utterances with the following characteristics (26 utterances):
a. The appearance of the word en (and) and oh at the beginning of
the
utterance.
b. The appearance of the pragmatic particles dus (so), ook (also) and niet
(not).
"We have one DQ, however, where all the subjects responded correctly, with an un-
usual, very horizontal declination line. Tliis could be an indication, but
because of the
lack of otlier examples any conclusion of this sort seeins to be premature.
`~The English translations are only meant as a general indication about the
meaning.
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c. The appearance of the pause particle uh.
d. Mistakes followed by self-repair.
e. Words which indicate uncertainty.
In most cases, the Q- and A-utterances possessed one or more of the character-
istics from (3). Next, these characteristics were removed from the utterancesl~
and the 33 original utterances were mixed with the edited ones. Almost the same
conditions were applied as in the first experiment; only the number of utterances
(total number was 72 of which 39 were edited) differed. Where the utterances
had two or more of these characteristics (11 utterances) they were removed in
arbitrary order to avoid an exponential growth of the number of these particu-
lar utterances. For example, an utterance with three characteristics would give
7(- 23 - 1) edited versions; we did not include all combinations but only an
arbitrary selection, e.g.:
(10) "And uh.. these are all coming~ going to Munich" (original)
(l0a) "And these are all coming~ going to Munich" (edited: 3c)
(lOb) "These are all coming~going to Munich" (edited: 3a)
(lOc) "These are all going to Munich" (edited: 3d)
In the second experiment 20 subjects took part.
3.6 Results
Figure 3.1 shows the difference in (yes)answers to utterances with (shaded rect-
angle) and without (white rectangle) special indicators. Note the considerable
variation in the number of utterances per indicator (- number of responses (n)
divided by 20). Figure 3.2 shows the same for (yes)questions.
In Figure 3.1 we can see for instance that 35~ of the utterances with indicator
en (and) at the beginning were interpreted as an answer. The same utterances
without en are interpreted as an answer in 55010 of the cases. If we turn to Figure
3.2 we can see that in 64~ of the cases with en the utterances are interpreted as
a question and 51~ when the en is removed.
The removal of the indicators en, dv.s and oh had a significant effect in both
answer and question task (in all cases: Xdf-1 ~ 4.00, p c 0.05); in the other cases
no significant effects occurred (in all cases: Xdf-1 C 1.23, p) 0.27).
Note that Figures 3.1 8c 3.2 do not have to be complements, because responses
to the same utterance by the same subject can be (no)question and (no)answer
(12~, or 166 out of 1440) or (yes)question and (yes)answer (10~0, or 149 out of
1440).
`cFirst the utterances were entered in the VAX computer and next the special words
were reinoved witli the aid of tlie IPO speecli software. This could be done with an
accuracy of 25 milliseconds. Some of the utterances (but only very few~ sounded a little
unnatural; iione of the subjects, however, noticed this.
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en dus uh niet ook oh repair uncert
n~ 220 180 80 20 40 20 80 120
Figure 3.1: The percentage of (yes)answers as a function of the presence (shaded
rectangle) and the absence (white rectangle) of special indicators.
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~] without indicator ~ with indicator
Figure 3.2: Tlie percentage of (yes)questions as a function of the presence (shaded
rectangle) and the absence (white rectangle) of special indicators.
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3.7 Discussion
From Table 3.1 it can be seen that the subjects were able to recognize the CF in
35010 (19 out of 54) of the cases; in 4~ (3 out of 54) the function was inverted.
Table 3.2 shows that important indicators to recognize the question function can
be the word en at the beginning of the utterance, and the words ook and dus.
These words were missing in the utterances which were recognized as answers.
When these words were removed from the Q-utterances they never shifted to
A-utterances completely, so other characteristics must be involved in the inter-
pretation.
We will now consider some of the indicators separately.
En at the beginning of the utterance: In Figure 3.1. we can see that the
removal of the word en is of consequence for the interpretation of the CF.
When the en is not removed, the subjects prefer the `question' interpre-
tation (35~ (yes)answer, 64~ (yes)question). When the en is cut out,
the responses shift to an `answer' interpretation (55~ (yes)answer, 51q
(yes)question). Note that the (yes)answers and (yes)questions are indepen-
dent because they were given in different tasks. Here it is to be expected
that the influence of prosodic aspects will be very small because the en was
never accentuated and forms only a small part of the speech signal of the
complete utterance.
Dus : In this case the shift from question responses (21q (yes)answer, 77~
(yes)question), when dus is included, to answer responses (59~ (yes)answer,
38~ (yes)question), when dus is removed, is rather dramatic. In this case
too, the word was never accentuated; so it can be expected that the prosodic
effects will be very small and that the shift is mainly caused by its textual
meaning.
Oh: Again we see a dramatic shift from question responses (40~ (yes)answer,
60~ (yes)question), when oh is included, to answer responses (95q
(yes)answer, 5~ (yes)question) when oh is removed. Note however that
in this case we had only one utterance (number of responses- 20) and the
CF of the original utterance was an ANSWER. The shift can be explained
by the fact that in Dutch the oh at the beginning is often used to express
surprise about the content of a previous statement and in many cases is
followed by an utterance which asks for an explanation. In this case the
oh was uttered because the subject in the dialogue experiment had not ex-
pected the previous question from the informant, because he did not pay
attention to her. So, the particle had nothing to do with the content of the
question.
Ook and niet: Although the removal of these particles had no significant effect,
in both cases the interpretation shifts from question to answer.
When ook is included: 45o-10 (yes)answer and 60~ (yes)question.
When ook is removed: 52~ (yes)answer and 43~ (yes)question.
When niet is included: 45~ (yes)answer and 55~ (yes)question.
When niet is removed: 65~ (yes)answer and 47~ (yes)question.
Semantically these words seem to contribute little to the CF. An explana-
tion for the shift can possibly be found in the prosodic properties of the
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words. Both words were accentuated and the removal of the accents could
have influenced the responses of the subjects.
The insertion of repair sequences, the expression of uncertainty and the use of the
pause particle uh did not change the responses significantly, so these indicators
do not seem to coiitribute to the interpretation of the CF.
3.8 Conclusion
To determine the question function of a declarative utterance, one can concentrate
on linguistic cues in the utterance and on contextual cues from the discourse
situation. In this paper we have concentrated on the first category, both prosodic
and textual cues.
It was found that only 48~ of the DQs in dialogues possessed a rising intona-
tion and that in other cases question indicators may come from Dutch pragmatic
particles such as en, dus and oh. `Easy cases' to determine the question function,
such as rising intonation, the use of the particles hè, toch and zeker and the use of
verbs like mean and say were excluded from our experiments and their influence
still has to be tested. ln almost 25~ of the cases the DQ could not be identified
from either prosodic or textual cues; so, question cues could only be provided by
the context.
An important shortcoming in the analysis ís that the removal of particular
words has the consequence of cutting out certain prosodic aspects as well. We
expect to solve this problem in a following experiment in which the utterances
will be presented on a screen.
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Chapter 4
The visual recognition of
declarative questions
R.J. Beun
~A slightly revised version of this chapter has been accepted for publication in:
Journal of Pragmatics~
abstract
In this paper it is discussed how questions in Dutch with a declarative sentence type can
be recognized in isolation and iti natural dialogue. Declarative questions were taken from
telephone dialogues where subjects tried to get iiiformation from an information clerk
at Amsterdam airport. In previous experiments these questions were isolated from the
original context and presented on tape to subjects together with a number of answers. A
disadvantage of this method ís that it is dií~icult to distinguish the influence of prosodic
indicators from that of textual ones. Here, an experiment is described where utterances
were presented on a screeii to eliminate prosodic cliaracteristics and to concentrate on
textual indicators only. In tlie interpretation by the subjects of the declarative as a
question tlie presence of certain pragmatic particles will be shown to play a decisive role.
4.1 Introduction
Two important aims in speech act theory are (1~ to describe how illocutionary
acts can change the mental state of agents over time and (2) to relate the syntactic
and semantic features of utterances to the illocutionary act that is performed.
In many Artificial Intelligence approaches the burden is placed on the devel-
opment of theories which describe the effects of utterances on the mental states
of agents participating in a dialogue in terms of beliefs, knowledge, and intentions
(see e.g., Cohen 8e Levesque (1989b~, Perrault (1989~, Bunt (1989a~~. The precise
role of certain syntactic and semantic features in contributing to the speech act is
usually limited to the sentence types declarative, imperative, and interrogative or
sometimes totally neglected. If we assume that the production of utterances with
particular features reveals particular aspects of the mental state of the speaker,
then we have to know precisely what features and what aspects. We will assume




illocutionary act and presume that the act is obtained from the application
of the
illocutionary force (IF) to its semantic contentl (Searle (1969), Gazdar
(1981),
Bunt(1989a)). In this paper, the determination of the act will be restricted to the
identification of the IF. We will try to answer the question as to which indicators
are potential candidates in the identification and how these indicators
correlate
with the IF of the utterance in a specific case.
Austin has already argued (Austin (1962): pp. 76~ that the circumstances
of the utterance are "an exceedingly important aid" in the
recognition of the
IF. Indicators in the utterance itself can be divided into two classes:
prosodic
and textual indicators. Possible indicators in the prosodic class can be
accentu-
ation, declination and special intonation patterns (see e.g., Hadding 8c
Studdert-
Kennedy (1974), Thorsen (1980), Geluykens (1987)). Textual cues are, for in-
stance, sentence type and special pragmatic particles (see e.g., van Dijk
(1977),
Berenst (1978), Abraham (1984)).
We will concentrate here on the information available in the utterance itself,
especially its textual features. The sentence type of the utterances will be re-
stricted to a declarative one and only those indicators will be considered
that
contribute to a question force of the declarative in natural dialogue. We
will call
these utterances declarative questions (DQs).
In some cases special characteristics are attached by the speaker to a DQ
to indicate its question force; in other cases the question force is indicated by
contextual cues only. The following simulated dialogues illustrate this point:
1. (a) A: ... Can you tell me what time the KL402 leaves from Schiphol
airport and what time my sister has to leave from Eindhoven by train
to catch her plane in time?
(b) B: The plane leaves at 12.30, she has to check in one hour before and
the trip from Eindhoven to Schiphol takes about one and a half hours.
(c) A: So, she has to leave around 9.l5 from Eindhoven?
(d) B: Yes.
(e) A: Thank you very much.
It is not difficult to think of an example where utterance 1(c) is used without the
question force:
2. (a) A: ... Can you tell me what time the KL402 leaves from Schiphol
airport and what time my sister has to leave from Eindhoven by train
to catch her plane in time?
(b) B: The plane leaves at 12.30, she has to check in one hour before and
the trip from Eindhoven to Schiphol takes about one and a half hours.
So, she has to leave around 9.,~5 from Eindhoven.
(c) A: Thank you very much.
Clearly, the italicized utterances in 1(c) and 2(b) have different forces, although
their surface structure and content are identical. Note that the punctuation
marks in both utterances do not have to correspond to prosodic cues. Quirk,
`We use tlie ter:ii semantic content or content iiistead of the often used propositioraal
content ( see Bunt (1~J89a): pp. 59).
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Greenbaum, Leech 8e Svartvik (1972) state that the question in 1(c) is similar in
force to tag questions and that the final rising tone suggests that the speaker takes
the answer yes as a foregone conclusion. In Dutch, however, (and probably also
in English) the utterance often lacks the final rise in natural spoken conversation
(Beun (1989)).
To determine the force indicators of a DQ we have opted for an empirical
method, where people were asked to decide whether a declarative was a question
or an answer.2 To exclude contextual dependency of the responses of the subjects
as much as possible, the utterances were taken from a fixed, relatively simple
domain of discourse, namely telephone dialogues about the arrival and departure
times of planes and trains from Amsterdam airport.
Before we discuss the experiment and its results in sections 4 and 5 respec-
tively, some attention should be devoted to how declaratives can be understood
as questions in natural dialogue. In section 4.2 we will sketch how DQs can be
picked out from the dialogues. In section 4.3 the most striking question markers
in the recorded dialogues will be considered and the results of previous auditory
experiments will be summarized.
4.2 The notion of declarative question
The notion of literal force subscribes to the idea that illocutionary force is built
into sentence form (see e.g., Levinson (1983)). This means that, unless the sen-
tence possesses explicit performative properties, a declarative is meant for stating
something, an interrogative for questioning and an imperative for ordering or re-
questing. So, the notion of literal force suggests a strong relation between sentence
type and function of the utterance. Any usage of a sentence not in accordance
with the previous notion is considered to be indirect.
Here, we will avoid the problem whether the declaratives discussed in this
paper are direct or indirect and consider declarative as a purely syntactic feature
of the sentence (see also G azdar (1981) ). From the set of declarative utterances
in the dialogues, it is possible to select a subset that functions as questions by a
rule concerning the beliefs of the dialogue participants as to who is the expert on
the topic of the utterance.
A precise definition of a declarative sentence is hard to give. Should we, for
instance, include prosodic properties in our definition, and can elliptic sentences
be determined as being declarative? For the present, we will leave this to the
intuition of the reader and concentrate on the way declarative utterances that
function as questions were selected.
Let us first introduce some abbreviations. BZp and MBx~p will be x believes
that p and x and y mutually believe that p(Bxp 8L Byp 8c BxByp 8c ByBxp 8c
...), respectively. To concentrate on the belief of one agent, a one-sided version of
mutual belief will also be used: BMB2yp (B2p 8c BZB~p 8c BxByBZp 8c ...).
The
content of the utterance U is p; H and S are hearer and speaker, respectively.
We call an utterance U a declarative question if and only if:
DEF:
-ZThe actual experiment was slightly more complicated; we will return to this in section
4.4.
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a. The sentence type of U is declarative.
b. S believes that H is the expert on the topic: BSExpertq(topic(U)).
c. S believes that it is mutually believed that H is the expert on the
topic:
BSMBSHExpertH(topic(U)).
From the Gricean maxim of quantity (Grice (1975)) it follows that the utter-
ances defined by DEF lead to an implicature, or as Searle suggests, an indirect
interpretation (Searle (1975)), for if the addressee already knows the content of
the utterance (and this is mutually believed) it would be superfluous.
Note that, if we assume that both `positive introspection' (BZp -~ BxBxp)
and `distribution of conjunction' (BzpBcBzq H Bx(pdcq)) hold, it can be inferred
that the notion of mutual belief can be expressed in terms of one-sided mutual
belief:
1. BxpBcBxMBxyp H BMBx~p
In the definition, the concept of (one-sided) mutual belief is crucial. If the speaker
does not believe that the hearer is the expert, then the speaker's utterance cannot
be meant as a question, therefore BSExpertH(topic(U)) must be true. On the
other hand if the speaker does not believe that BHExpertH(topic(U)), the speaker
would think that the hearer cannot interpret the utterance as superfluous and
therefore cannot infer that the utterance is meant as a question. So, if the speaker
produces an utterance for which he does not expect an answer, then the utterance
can never be meant as a question. Therefore, BSBHExpertH(topic(U)) is also




which is equivalent to BMBSHExpertH(topic(U)) and by means of (1) is equal
to DEF (b) and (c). Note that if BSExpertH(topic(U)) is not the case,
the
utterance can never be meant as a question; however, the hearer may interpret
the utterance as a question if BHExpertH(topic(U)). We did not investigate
these cases.
One might think that the selection of the declarative questions from real-life
dialogues still causes great difficulty because of the lack of a precise definition
of terms such as expert, topic3 and declarative; in practice, though, we seem
to
have a very good intuition of the terms and we will try to clarify this by
some
examples.
We will refer to topic loosely as what the utterance is aóout.
For instance, (3)
is about the goal of the speaker.4
3. "I want to know what time it is"
The utterance is, although declarative, rejected by DEF because
we will presume
that the speaker is the expert on his own goals. So topic is restricted to the
literal
35ee for instance Lugtenburg (1985) for a survey of definitions on topic.
~Here, punctuation marks are left out to concentrate on lexical cues
only; other inter-
pretations can be obtained when, for inst.ance, in spoken form special
intonation patterns
are used.
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interpretation of the utterance. The same argument counts for sentence (4),
where a performative is used in the matrix sentence, for the explicit performative
indicates that the utterance is about the act of the speaker and the speaker knows
best what act he performed by uttering (4).
4. "I state that the capital of Corsica is Corte"
A(perhaps unwanted) consequence of DEF is that sentence (5) is also rejected
by DEF because of the explicit performative in the matrix sentence.
5. "I ask you what time it is"
The previous examples bring us to the cases where DEF is satisfied. We
simply change the first person to the second, so in many cases where the matrix
sentence contains a boulemaic, epístemic or doxastic verb in the second person,
present or past tense, the definition is fulfilled, e.g.:
6. "You want to go to Venaco"
7. "You know whether Corsica is ruled by Italians"
8. "You thought that I have to leave at ten"
For the addressee knows best what he wants, thinks, etc. The same can be said
about performative verbs in the second person, past tense, e.g.:
9. "You asked the exact departure time"
10. "You said that the plane will leave at ten"
Again, the addressee knows best what he asked, said, etc. So, one would expect
that if these utterances are presented to subjects, they will identify them as a
question. In special circumstances, however, one can use these forms to highlight
certain aspects of an addressee's knowledge or actions, e.g.:
11. "You said you would leave at ten. So, why are you still hanging around?"
12. "You asked the exact departure times. Well, here they are."
These utterances are mainly used as an introduction to criticize an act performed
by the hearer (11) or to refresh the hearer's memory about his own acts (12). So,
the interpretation of the utterance as a question can be rejected by contextual
information. We did not encounter any of these examples in our material.
All previous examples have clear indicators in the sentence itself. In (13)
it is impossible to determine the illocutionary force of the utterance without
contextual knowledge.
13. "The train leaves at 12.00"
Uttered by an information clerk the IF can be an answer, uttered by an informa-
tion seeker the force can be a question. It was expected, however, that certain
textual or, in the case of spoken dialogues, prosodic cues could give an indication
about its IF. This would imply that, if the utterances are removed from the con-
text, subjects can still determine its IF. In the next section we will discuss which
indicators probably contribute to the question force of a declarative.
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4.3 Question indicators in natural dialogue
In this section a survey will be given of the question indicators we have come
across in the DQs of the recorded dialogues. These dialogues were obtained
from an experiment carried out in 1984 and 1985. In the experiment, twenty-
four Dutch-speaking subjects had to determine by telephone the departure and
arrival times of airplanes and trains from an information clerk at Schiphol airport.
The role of the information clerk in the experiment was played by a well-trained
person. By using the telephone as the communication channel we avoided non-
verbal aspects of the communication, so all force indicators could be collected
from the speech material and the set-up of the experiment. To exclude speech
interruptions in the recorded signal, the information clerk and the subject were
recorded on different tracks of the tape recorder. (See Beun (1985) for a more
detailed discussion.)
In total 387 questions were counted in 189 dialogues. Almost 20~ of the
questions (77 in total) had a declarative sentence type. In Table 4.1 the question
indicators are shown together with the number of times they occur in the dia-
logues. Note that one utterance can have two or more indicators. For example, all
utterances with the indicator tag "...hè" ("...right")5 at the end also had a rising
intonation at the end. In total only 47 utterances (61~ of the DQs) possessed one
or more of the indicators of Table 4.1; the remaining 30 utterances (39~) did not
have any overt indicators. It should be stressed, however, that these results only
count for spoken dialogues. In Beun 8c Bunt (1987) it was shown that the number
of DQ's dramatically decreases if people converse without prosodic information:
in terminal conversation the percentage declaratives used for questioning is less
than 2q.
Table 4.1: Overt question indicators in DQs and their percentage of occurrence related
to the total number of DQs in the dialogues.
I Question indicator
, rising intonation at the end 48q (37)
i the particle toch ~ 4~ (3)
I "... hè" ( "...right" ) 10~ (8)
"u zei ..." ("you said ...") 6~ (5)
j"u kunt .. . zeggen" ("you can tell...~) 1~ (1)
I "u weet ..." ("you know ...") 3~ (2)
'"u bedoelt ..." ( "you mean ...") I 1~ (1) I
I"u wilt ..." ("you want ...") ~ 1~ (1) !,
'~ "u hebt ..." ("you have ...") 3~ (2) ; i
~~ ~~oh, dus ..." (~~oh, so ...n) ~ lq (1) '
In the experiment described in Beun (1989) these remaining utterances were
"Tlie Englisli translations are inteiided pragmatic equivalences.
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taken out of the original context, potential indicators were removed and the edited
versions were compared with the original ones.~ Subjects had to indicate the force
(question or answer) from the speech signal without contextual information.
It was found that words like dus (so), oh and en (and) at the beginning of
the utterance significantly influenced the responses of the subjects. Removing
ook (also), niet (not), the pause indicator uh, mistakes followed by self-repair and
words which indicate uncertainty did not significantly influence the responses
of the subjects. A shortcoming in the analysis was that the removal of certain
words had the consequence of cutting out certain prosodic aspects as well. We
were accordingly unable to discriminate prosodic indicators from textual ones.




Twenty Dutch native-speakers took part in the experiment.7 Their task was
divided into two parts: in one part they had to determine from the (Apple Mac-
intosh) screen whether or not an utterance was originally used as an answer
(answer task), in the other part they had to determine whether or not an utter-
ance was used as a question (question task).8 One advantage of splitting up the
answer and question tasks, instead of simply asking to choose between answer
and question, is that it can easily be determined whether the responses in both
tasks are related or not. In each part 300 utterances were presented; the utter-
ances of the two parts were equal, only the order differed. Answer task, question
task and the two orders were counterbalanced, so that we had 4 subgroups of 5
subjects.
The subjects were told that the utterances presented on the screen were iso-
lated from real-life Schiphol dialogues. So, from the beginning of the experiment
they were aware of the domain of discourse.~ We did not tell them that only
declaratives were presented. They could think for as long as they wanted and
after one part a break of about 15 minutes was inserted.
If the response of the subjects was positive they had to push a green button
in front of them, if negative they had to push a red button. They always had to
make a choice, even in doubtful cases. After pushing one of the buttons a new
utterance appeared after one second. All utterances were complete sentences,
beginning with a capital letter and were presented without punctuation, except
for a very few cases where commas were added to improve legibility.
~Utterances with tlie overt illdicators of Table 4.1 (for example rising intonation at
the end) were left out because it was feared that the subjects would only pay attention
to these clear cases to d15tn1gI11Sh the IF.
'The subjects were of both sexes, all over 18 and mainly students and people from the
institute.
gThe utterances were only based on the declarative questions and answers from the
recorded dialogue~, so, coutrary to the previous experinients, the responses of the subject
could not be coTnpared wit,h a real-life utterance.
flThis was done to avoid the subjects discovering the dolnain and adapting their re-
sponses during the experiment.
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4.4.2 The corpus of utterances
In the experiment three syntactic categories of declaratives were
used, namely a.
S-V-A, b. S-Vl-A-V2 and c. A- V-S, where S is the subject, V (or VI and V2)
the verb and A an adverbial, consisting of one or more elements taken from a
set of times and places and their connecting prepositions, e.g., from Montreal,
at
twelve, etc. or a subordinate sentence (see e.g., Quirk et al. (1972), de Vooys
(1967)). For instance:lo
1. (a) Het vliegtuig vertrekt om twaalf uur uit Montreal
(The plane leaves at twelve from Montreal)
(b) Het vliegtuig is om twaalf uur gearriveerd
(The plane is at twelve arrived)
(c) Om twaalf uur vertrekt het vliegtuig
(At twelve leaves the plane)
The subject S was chosen from the following set of references:
{Ik (I), U (you), hij (he), zij (she), de trein (the train), de bus (the
bus), de reistijd (the travel time), de reis (the trip), het vliegtuig (the
plane), die (that~those), dat (that~those)}
Let us call these utterances simple utterances. Next, one or more pragmatic
particles were added at arbitrary, but syntactically correct, places to the
simple
utterances. These particles were taken from the following set:ll
{en (and), oh (oh), dus (so), wel, tochl~, ook (also), niet (not)}
En and oh were only added at the beginning of the utterance. To avoid
recognition
of the same recurring utterances, S and A were also varied, e.g.:
2. Het vliegtuig vertrekt morgenmiddag
(The plane leaves tomorrow afternoon)
3. En de trein vertrekt om twaalf uur
(And the train leaves at twelve)
4. De bus vertrekt dus om vier uur
(The bus leaves so at four)
5. En het vliegtuig vertrekt niet om 1~. 40 uur
(And the plane does not leave at 14.~0 hours)
Here we neglected the influence of the length of the utterance on the interpretation
of its IF. It is to be expected, however, that the force will mainly be determined
by the meaning of the words. Note that we cannot change S in an
arbitrary
way, otherwise in some cases the utterances cannot be compared on the basis
of
the added words only. For example, the interpretation of the force of (6)
can be
i"Some of the English glosses are ill-formed because the Dutch
sentences were literally
translated.
"This set was based on the most frequently occurring particles in
the recorded dialogue
material.
12A translation of the words wel and toch is hard to give and will be
omitted.
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completely different from the force of ( 7) because the subjects were aware of the
domain of discourse. They knew, for instance, that ( 6) could never be uttered
by the information clerk and (7) can be uttered by both. So there clearly are
asymmetries in the interpretation of the utterances.
6. Ik vertrek om tien uur
(I leave at ten)
7. Het vliegtuig vertrekt om tien uur
(The plane leaves at ten)
The new utterances were mixed with the simple utterances and presented one
by one to the subjects.
Table 4.2: Number of utterances presented in the experiment, classified into
syntactic features and the added particle. The numbers between brackets refer
to the number of utterances used in the results; utterances with more than one








en 19 2 I ? 28 (22) I
dus 30 6 10 46 (25)
toch 30 5 ~ 10 45 (24) I
ook ? 1 2 10 (5)
niet 9 0 1 10 (9)
wel 8 2 0 10 (7)
oh 23 2 8 33 (21)
1 1 particle 35 4 6 45
total 216 30 54 300 (160)
Table 4.2 gives a survey of the type of utterances presented in the experiment.
For instance, 216 utterances had an S- V-A syntax, in 30 of them only the word
dus was included and 25 of the utterances with dus were compared with the
simple utterances in the results.
In the experiment the hypothesis stated in section 4.2 was also tested, namely
that utterances with mental state or performative verbs (and their restrictions) in
the matrix sentence will result in a question interpretation. Therefore the verbs
zeggen (say; 6 utterances), óedoelen (mean; 5), willen (want; 6) and vermoeden
(suspect; 6) were put in the second person singular. Although they were part of
the 300 utterances, their results were treated separately from the other utterances.
4.5 Results
Before discussing the results, let us introduce some abbreviations for frequently
used terms.
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( yes)answer: the utterance is interpreted as an answer in the
answer task.
(yes)questiou: the utterance is interpreted as a question in the question
task.
(-)utterance: the simple utterance, that is the utterance
without certain par-
ticles.
(f)utterance: the utterance with added particle.
In Figures 4.1 and 4.2 the percentages of positive
responses in the answer
and question tasks are shown. These figures show the difference in
(yes)answers













en dus toch ook niet wel oh
I A
Figure 4.1: The shift of (yes)answers as a function of the absence
(white rectangle)
and the presence (shaded rectangle) of pragmatic particles. Line lA shows
the mean
value of (yes)answers with respect to the simple utterances.
We can see for instance in Figure 4.1 that simple utterances without en (and)
at the beginning were interpreted in 83~ of cases as an answer. The same ut-
terances with en were interpreted in 56~ of cases as an answer. On the other
hand, if we return to the question function in Figure 4.2, we see a shift from
(-)utterances to utterances with the en indicator of ll07'o to 32q. The shift in
the utterances without or with dus (so) is even more dramatic: in the answer
task from 9101o to 18~; in the question task from 8~ to 83q. The (t)utterances
with en, dus, toch and oh differed significantly from the (-)utterances, in
both
the answer and question task. (In all cases Xdf-1 1 13, p c 0.001)




en dus toch ook niet wel oh
Figure 4.2: The shift of (yes)questions as a function of the absence (white rectangle)
and the presence (shaded rectangle) of pragmatic particles. Line l,~ shows the mean
value of (yes)questions with respect to the simple utterances.
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The total number of responses per particle can be calculated from the numbers
between brackets in Table 4.2. For instance, we have 22 utterances with en,
22
matching (-)utterances and 20 subjects, so the total number is 880 (- 2 x 22 x 20).
From Figures 4.1 and 4.2 we can see that the presented (-)utterances were
not neutral with respect to a question or answer interpretation. In the answer
task 86~ of them was interpreted as (yes)answer, in the question task llq was
interpreted as (yes)question, indicated respectively by line lA and lq. Note that
Figures 4.1 and 4.2, although they show complementary results in all cases, do not
have to be complements because the answer and question tasks were independent.
The results of the performative and mental state verbs are depicted in Ta-
ble 4.3. The addition of particles hardly influenced the responses and therefore the
values in Table 4.3 are the mean values of both (-)utterances and (~-)utterances.
Table 4.3: Percentage (yes)answers and (yes)questions as a function of the
main verb.
(yes)answers (yes)questions
zeggen (say) lOq 78~
bedoelen (mean) 7~ 93~
willen (want) lOq 93q
vermoeden (suspect) 3~ 93~
4.6 Discussion
From Figures 4.1 and 4.2 we can see that the simple utterances were not neu-
tral with respect to the answer~question force. Lines lA and !q show that in
almost 90~ of the cases the simple utterances were interpreted as answers or
non-questions. In 75~ the topic of the simple utterances was train or airplane
information, like:
1. "The train leaves at twelve"
Intuitively it seems very natural to interpret these utterances as an answer. In
section 4.2, though, we suggested that, depending on the speaker, (1) could be
either an answer or a question. So, why do subjects prefer the answer interpre-
tation?
If we take a closer look at the recorded dialogues we see that almost all answers
have the following form: declarative, no special discourse marker (i.e. no rising
intonation, no particle, etc.) and complete sentences. On the other hand, only
6q of the DQs (5 out of 77) have the same form as the answers. Therefore, we
could say that, if we have to choose between question or answer, every declarative
is an answer by default, unless special indicators are added.
The deviation from a 100~ answer interpretation of the simple utterances is
mainly caused by sentences that were clearly uttered by the information seeker,
such as:
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2. "I have to be there at eleven in the morning"
So, another criterion was the speaker of the utterance. This was confirmed after-
wards by most of the subjects. All subjects were interviewed after the experiment
and 80~10 of them stated that during the experiment they tried to imagine who
the speaker could have been, the information clerk or the information seeker.
The subjects also stated that in many cases they had problems making a de-
cision. It is very likely, however, that subjects responded highly consistently in
the answer and question tasks, because Figures 4.1 and 4.2 are almost comple-
mentary.
The results agree with the experiments described in Beun (1989) . It was al-
ready noted that cutting out certain words in the acoustic signal removed both
prosodic and textual aspects of the utterance. Therefore it could not be concluded
which feature played a decisive role in the subject's responses. The similar results
of the experiment described in this paper strongly suggest that prosodic features,
other than a rising intonation at the end, played a minor role in the previous
experiments. This is supported by the fact that all particles in the latter exper-
iments were not accentuated and formed only a small part of the total speech
signal.
This brings us to the next topic, namely how do the particles influence the
responses of the subjects? Although all particles influenced the responses in the
same direction, that is, a decrease in answer interpretations and an increase in
question interpretations when the particles were added, we will concentrate only
on the cases where significant differences appeared: en (and), dus (so), oh (oh)
and toch.
En (and) at the beginning of the utterance: In general en will be used in
Dutch as a conjunction between two propositions or a sequential ordering
of two events. In this case the first conjunct is missing. So, here we have
two possibilities. First, there is only one "conjunct" . In this case the en
does not represent a conjunction at all. Second, there are two conjuncts
but the first conjunct is situated elsewhere. The first solution is not an
attractive one, because it would commit us to changing the meaning of
en drastically and also it would not correspond to the empirical data of
the recorded dialogues, since in almost 90~ (17 out of 19) of the recorded
declaratives with en, the en linked a previous statement uttered by the
dialogue partner.13 This link was established by a return to the topic of
the first conjunct.
How can the second possibility help us to explain the significant difference
in responses in Figures 4.1 and 4.2? First, it might be assumed that any
word or morpheme neutral with respect to a question force added at the
beginning of an utterance will change the responses of the subjects. At
first sight en seems quite neutral with respect to a question or answer
interpretation, so we have no evidence against this assumption. On the
other hand, maybe en is not neutral with respect to both interpretations.
From the sentences with mental state verbs (e.g., `mean' and `want') we
know that subjects take the expert on the topic into account, i.e. declara-
'aThe utterance is not necessarily the previous utterance.
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tives uttered by the non-expert are interpreted as questions. So, if subjects
believe that the declarative with en at the beginning is uttered by the non-
expert, they would prefer a question interpretation. But why would subjects
believe that these declaratives are uttered by the non-expert?
Again, a closer look at the recorded dialogues is required. In almost all cases
en at the beginning of a declarative connects the declarative of the speaker
with an answer of the dialogue partner. The subjects were told that the
utterances always came from the beginning of a speech turn, so they knew
that the utterance was not a second part of a conjunction spoken by the
same speaker. In our discourse domain an answer is always uttered by the
expert on the topic.14 If the en does not connect two arbitrary statements,
but two statements about the same topic (see van Dijk (1977)), then the
second statement (or rather `declarative') is always uttered by the non-
expert and so, the utterance will be interpreted as a question.
Dus (so): In the recorded dialogues all declarative questions with dus were used
as drawing a conclusion from one or more statements of the dialogue partner
and, in some cases, mutual world knowledge. If dv,s is uttered by the one
who presents the facts, it is usually done at the end of the same turn in
which the facts were presented. On the other hand, if the utterance with
dus is at the beginning of a turn, then the utterance is mostly uttered by
the non-expert as a conclusion from the facts presented by the dialogue
partner. So the total utterance will be interpreted as a question.
Toch: According to Pander Maat and Sauer (1986) toch focusses on conflicting
beliefs and expectations between the dialogue partners during the dialogue.
If in cooperative dialogues one of the purposes is to avoid conflicts or to
find solutions for conflicts, then the dialogue partner is exhorted by the
dialogue situation to respond. So the confiict seems to elicit the response
and the word toch only draws attention to the conflict. However, the same
can be stated about the accentuated particle wel, which often corrects a
negation in a previous utterance. From the experiment, it followed that no
significant shifts appeared when the particle wel was removed and there-
fore the conflicting situation cannot be the only reason. Hence, beside the
adversative element, toch also seems to express that the hearer is exhorted
to react, which could explain the dramatic shift in the subjects' responses.
Oh: In Dutch oh seems to work in the same way as the English
oh, therefore
the function will be discussed from the English particle. Schiffrin (1987)
discusses that English oh marks different tasks of information management
in discourse. She distinguishes four different functions of
oh: (1) the in-
troduction of a repair unit, (2) as a preface in questions, answers and~or
acknowledgements, (3) as a marker of the status of information (e.g., new
vs. old information) and (4) the introduction of a shift in subjective ori-
entation (e.g., the intensity of a speaker's commitment to the truth of a
proposition). As an overall function oh marks a focus of a speaker's at-
tention and marks information as more salient. The particle is often used
'~In other domains of cliscour.e, such as fOI' lllstallce an examination, the questioner
can be the expert.
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when locally provided information does not correspond to a speaker's prior
expectations and is often followed by a request for clarification and elabo-
ration.
If the subjects are aware of these functions, this can explain the shift of
subjects' responses. The question function of the utterance can easily be
determined from the particle itself. Note, however, that the shift is not as
dramatic as in the case of dus and toch, which is probably caused by the
ambiguous meaning of oh. The functions, (3~ and (4~ and the initiation
of an answer and~or acknowledgement in (2~ do not suggest any question
function at all.
4.7 Conclusion
We hypothesized that in the decision, whether the illocutionary force of a declar-
ative is interpreted as a question or not, three indicators play an important role:
prosodic, textual and contextual characteristics of the utterance. In this paper
we have mainly concentrated on the textual indicators. We found that two types
of textual indicators are relevant in the recognition of a declarative as a question
in isolation, namely:
1. Indicators that determine the expert on the topic of the utterance.
2. Indicators that express conflicting beliefs between the hearer and speaker,
and~or surprise of the speaker about a stated proposition.
Examples of the first type are the use of special verbs (e.g., epistemic, performa-
tive~ in the second person, present or past tense, and the use of particles like en
at the beginning of the utterance and dus. Examples of the second type are the
particles oh and toch.
The results of the visual and the auditory experiments are very similar. Since
the subjects in the latter experiment could decide on prosodic and textual infor-
mation and irt the first experiment on textual information only, it is likely that,
apart from rising intonation, prosodic characteristics have played a minor role
in the recognition of a declarative as a question irr spoken utterances. It would
be premature to conclude that prosodic characteristics always play a minor role,
because in 48010 of the recorded DQs a rising intonation was used at the end of
the utterance and these utterances were not tested in the auditory experiment.
The conclusion is also weakened by the fact that subjects hardly use declarative
questions in dialogues where prosodic cues are absent.
It should be stressed that prosodic cues can be more important in languages
where textual marking is less often used for questioning (e.g., French, Italian and
modern Greek~15. If the recognition of the question heavily depends on prosodic
cues and no syntactic or morphological information is available, it would not only
be interesting to know which prosodic cues are used in spoken conversation but
also which cues are used in conversation if no prosodic information is available.
From some examples in section 4.2 it followed that the function of the indica-
tors as a reference to the expert can be overruled by contextual cues. In general
all the indicators discussed in this paper can be overruled by contextual cues; if
-"'Tltis wac pointed out by Hartmut Haberland (personal comniunication}.
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contextual cues are ínsufficient, however, indicators can contribute to a question
interpretation of the utterance.
A point for future research is to determine why people use a declarative
instead of an interrogative to ask a question. If a declarative is used to express
that the speaker has a certain supposition about the declarative's content, it is
to be expected that contextual information will play a crucial role.
Chapter 5




Questions in spoken dialogues are often uttered with a declarative sentence type. Since
more than 50q of these questions cannot be recognized as such without contextual fea-
tures, a speaker must have, at the risk of misunderstanding, special reasons to use a
declarative form instead of aii interrogative one. To determine the contextual features
that contribute to the use of a declarative question, two experiments were carried out.
In the experiinents dialogues taken from transcriptions of Dutch telephone conversations
were presented in printed form to subjects. In the first experiment the preference of the
subjects was tested for a declarative or an interrogative form; in the second experiment
the subjects had to indicate the certainty of the speaker about the propositional con-
tent of the declarative. It was found that preference for a declarative form is low if no
information about the content of the question was provided in the dialogue; preference
increases if information can be derived froin conversational principles or implication, or
if the information was literally provided in the dialogue. The outcome correlates signif-
icantly with the subjects' responses about the speaker's degree of certainty. Moreover,
it is argued that, although verification is an important function of declarative questions,
the syntactic form can also be influenced by topic cliange and rules of politeness.
5.1 Introduction
In spoken information dialogues, almost 20~ of questions are put in a declara-
tive form and in more than half of these cases the question function cannot be
identified without contextual features ( Beun ( 1989)). Since hearers hardly ever
doubt the function of questions in dialogues, they must use contextual knowledge
for identification if overt question indicators are absent; the speaker, on the other
hand, must be sure that the function will be recognized, so he must count on the
contextual knowledge available to the hearer.
Unless special question markers (e.g., intonation patterns, special particles,
propositional content) are used, a declarative question ( DQ) can be considered to




standing, special reasons to use a declarative (D-form) instead of an interrogative
(I-form) as the syntactic form of a question. In this paper we will try to find out
what information is communicated by the speaker if a D-form is used and how
contextual features influence the use of a D-form of questions in natural-language
dialogues.
Contextual knowledge does not only include knowledge about the world, but
also knowledge about relevant aspects of the mental states of the dialogue partic-
ipants in terms of intentions, beliefs, expectations, etc. and general principles of
cooperative and rational behaviour. Here, mental states will be restricted to the
participants' intentions and beliefs, and it is assumed that a mental state can be
changed during the dialogue by means of communicative acts performed by the
participants. For instance, if a speaker utters a declarative, the hearer may take
over the proposition expressed by the declarative unless he has evidence to the
contrary, or, if a speaker utters an interrogative, the hearer may come to believe
that the speaker wants to know something.
To find out which particular contextual knowledge influences the use of a D-
form or an I-form of questions in a dialogue situation, the preference of subjects
for one of the two forms was tested in an experiment. In a second experiment
the speaker's certainty about the propositional content of the D-form was tested.
The type of dialogue will be restricted to so-called information dialogues (Bunt
(1989a)), where the participants have the sole purpose of transferring certain fac-
tual information. In these dialogues it is not only assumed that the participants
behave in a cooperative (Grice (1975~) and rational (Allwood (1976~) way, but
also apply certain rules of politeness (Leech (1983)). The domain of discourse
will be restricted to the exchange of information about the arrival and departure
times of aircraft and trains.
Before we discuss the experiments and their results, let us first focus on some
proposed functions of DQs in dialogues.
5.2 The function of declarative questions
Consider the following telephone dialogue between an informant at Amsterdam
airport (I) and an information seeker (S):1
Dialogue A
I: Schiphol Information.
S: Good morning. Next Monday I want to go by plane to
Paris,
I: Yes. . .
S: and I have to be there at about two o'clock in the
afternoon. What time do I have to leave to be there
in time?
' All dialogues considered in this paper were recorded at the Institute for Perception
Research in Eindhoven (IPO). Iu order to focus on t.he relevant part of the dialogues, some
transcription symbols have been omitted from the original transcriptions. Punctuation
marks do not correspond to prosodic features and a,re only added to improve legibility.
For more detailed information, see Beun (1985).
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I: Well, the plane leaves at 11.30 and it will arrive at
13.30 and there is another one at ... no,
You said Saturday?
The italicized utterance by I is an example of a question with a D-form. Here,
the use of the declarative as a question is accentuated by the question mark; in
spoken dialogues, however, overt question indicators are often omitted and most
of the recognition comes from contextual cues. Even prosodic characteristics, like
a final rising intonation, can be overruled by the circumstances of the utterance
(Geluykens (1987)).
In Beun (1988a) the idea was discussed that the interpretation of the declar-
ative as a question depends on the mutual belief of the hearer and speaker that
the hearer is the expert on the topic of the utterance. For instance, in "You said
Saturday" S is both hearer and expert, since S usually knows best which acts he
has performed, and therefore the utterance may be interpreted as a question.2
The belief of the dialogue participants as to who is the expert on the topic can
come from the utterance itself or from its circumstances.
It is unclear, however, why a D-form was used instead of an I-form. If a speaker
asks a question with a declarative sentence type he is typically violating the
Gricean cooperative principle (Grice (1975)) and one or more of its corresponding
maxims; so the speaker may have special reasons for choosing the declarative
form. Note that it is not obvious which maxims are violated. One could think
of the quality maxim because the speaker does not have enough evidence for his
statement. On the other hand, if the speaker thinks that the hearer knows the
value of the expressed proposition, he is communicating superfluous information,
and therefore violates the quantity maxim. One could even argue that the wrong
surface structure is used, hence also the manner maxim could have been violated.
Intuitively, the DQ in the example mentioned above functions as a verification,
i.e. beside signalling to the hearer that the speaker wants certain information, the
speaker also expresses a weak belief about the propositional content of the DQ.
Another use of DQs (which does not follow from the example above) is associated
with the development of the topic during the dialogue (Springorum (1986)). Let
us consider both functions more closely.
5.2.1 Declarative questions as verifications
Quirk, Greenbaum, Leech and Svartvik (1972) state that the speaker puts a pos-
itive (or negative) assumption and a neutral expectation in a DQ, and that the
casual tone suggests that the speaker takes the answer "yes" (or "no" ) as a fore-
gone conclusion. This statement is not easily verified, however. If a speaker has
a certain assumption about the answer, how then can his expectation be neutral?
And, is there any reason to assume that a speaker makes certain assumptions
about the content of the answer, except by intuition?
To some extent, the assumed belief can be inferred from empirical data. Tak-
ing a closer look at the corpus of recorded telephone dialogues, we see that 64
2Again, this example is highly context-dependent. Utterances like "You know what
time it is" or "You feel sickn are probably more convincing, because a speaker has no
direct access to a hearer'e mental state and therefore can never be the ezpert on the
hearer's mental state.
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out of 77 DQs (83010) evoked a positive answer from the dialogue
partner; in only
5 cases (6~) was the answer negative. Hence, it appears
that the questioners
have certain beliefs or assumptions about the content of the question,
as it seems
implausible that they would evoke so many positive responses without
these.3
More evidence about the assumed belief comes from the form of repetitions of
answers in the dialogues (Beun (1985)). An important scheme of the functional
elements in the dialogue structure is the following:
A: - Question
B: - Answer
A: - Repetition of the answer
B: - Response to the repetition
It was found that one of the possible functions of the repetition of the answer
is a verification of that answer. The belief about the content of the verification
seems to be very strong because the information has previously been stated by
the dialogue partner. In all cases where a repetition was a complete
sentence,
the sentence type was declarative and the repetition evoked a positive response.
So, at least in these cases, questions with a declarative sentence type
strongly
indicate a certain belief of the speaker about the content.
If an answer is repeated by means of a DQ, the information about the content
of the DQ is literally provided in the preceding discourse; however, as we can see




S: Good morning. I would like to know the arrival time
of the plane from Nice, flight number KL338.
I: That is today?
In this case, the information in the DQ that the arrival time refers to
the same day
as the day of the conversation cannot be derived solely from the semantic
content
of the utterance by S. The information seems to come from a pragmatic
rule which
roughly states that, if no information is provided about the day of arrival, the day
of the conversation is assumed as long as no evidence to the contrary exists.
We
will assume that the inference is triggered by the Gricean cooperative principle,
since S' utterance is conversationally inadequate with respect to an
unequivocal
determination of the day of arrival.
So, we can hypothesize that the declarative sentence type
of a question in
some cases will be caused by a certain belief or assumption about
the content of
the question and that the origin of the belief may come from
different sources.
In the experiments we will consider the following origin of
information about the
content. (In the examples below we will refer to the dialogues
enclosed in the
appendix.)
'Although it is tempting t.o say that the beliefs of both participants correspond,
we
can only conclude that the belief of the responding person corresponds
with the content
of the DQ. Whether the content. of the DQ corresponds to the belief of the
questioner is
precisely what we are trying to find out.
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. The information was literally given by the dialogue partner in the previous
discourse or could be inferred by implication from a previous utterance
of the dialogue partner. An example of this type is dialogue 3a in the
appendix.
. The information was derived by implicatu.re from Gricean conversational
principles (Grice (1975)) such as the quantity or the relevance maxim.
Implicatures from the quantity maxim may come from the first or the second
submaxim, i.e. `make your contribution as informative as is required for
the current purpose of the exchange' and `do not make your contribution
more informative than is required', respectively. An example of the first
submaxim is dialogue 5a, an example of the second is dialogue 8a.
The relevance maxim will be restricted to the specific case of a ques-
tion~answer pair. It will be supposed that the semantic content of an
answer is related to the content of the previous question. An example is
dialogue 2a.
. No information could be derived from the previous discourse but only from
world knowledge of the speaker of the target, or the information was not
derivable at all. Examples are dialogue 4a and dialogue 9a, respectively.
5.2.2 Declarative questions and topical development
Another use of DQs was found by Springorum (1986). He described Dutch dia-
logues where a doctor is diagnosing a patient's illness and notes that questions
asked by the doctor are often put in a D-form when attention is shifted to an-
other topic in the dialogue. It was not possible to recover the doctor's assumed
belief about the content of the DQ from these dialogues, so this might suggest
that the function of a D-form in a question may be the announcement of a new
topic in the dialogue. This implies that topical aspects may influence the use
of a declarative sentence type in questions and therefore we will also take these
aspects into account.
In the experiments four types of topical development will be considered: topic
contánuation, shift, recycling and change.4
. Topic continuation implies that the topic of the previous turn is related to
the topic of the DQ. In the dialogues, topic continuation was established in
two ways:
a. The informant wants elucidation of a question previously asked by the
information seeker. An example of this type is dialogue la in the
appendix.
b. The information seeker wants elucidation of an answer previously given
by the informant. An example of this type is dialogue 2a.
`Theae types were taken frotn Gardner (1987). Gardner introduces two more types:
topic introduction and reintroduction. The first concerns the first topic once the initial
stage has passed. Since no DQ comes directly after the initial stage this type will not be
considered liere. The latter concerns a return to a previous topic, whilst the topic of a
previous aequence is not related to any other topic in tlie dialogue (e.g., interruptions).
This type did not appear in our dialogues either.
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In many cases co-referentiality is an important indicator for topic continu-
ation, especially the use of demonstratives which refer to a certain concept
mentioned in the previous speech turn.5
. Topic ahift occurs when the topic of the DQ is linked to the previous ut-
terance but broaches a different aspect of the utterance. For instance, the
previous utterance is about `indirect flights' and the DQ is about `non-stop
flights' (e.g., dialogue 12a).
. Topic change occurs where the topic of the DQ is unrelated to all previous
topics in the exchange. For inatance, S asks what time planes arrive from
Moskow, I answers the question and next, S aska whether any buses go
from Amsterdam to Schiphol airport (e.g., dialogue 6b).
~ Topic recycling occurs if the topic of the DQ changes with regard to the topic
of the previous exchange and continues with regard to earlier exchanges
(e.g., dialogue 3b).
b.3 The experiments
Two experiments teated how contextual features influenced the subjects' pref-
erence for a D- or I-form and how contextual features infuenced the speaker's
certainty (indicated by the subjects) about the content of the DQ. In both exper-
iments dialogues were presented in printed form to 24 subjects; all subjecte from
the first experiment differed from the subjects of the second. The subjects were
Dutch native apeakers, of both sexes, all over 18 and mainly students and staff
membera from the institute.
5.3.1 General structure of the dialogues
Eighteen dialogues were taken from transcriptions of Dutch telephone conversa-
tions ( see also the appendix), recorded in a previous experiment (Beun (1985)),
between an informant (I) from Amsterdam airport (Schiphol) and an information-
seeker (S). To improve legibility, non-relevant errors and hesitations were removed
from the transcriptions. In many cases the dialogue presented was not the whole
original dialogue but only a relevant part. The sequential organization of the
dialoguea used in the experiment was as follows:
. Each dialogue had an initial stage of identification and greeting, for exam-
ple, "Schiphol Information", "Good morning", and so on. These beginning
sequences were added to induce the subjects to think that the only infor-
mation exchange between I and S was the information available on paper.
. After the initial stage S asked a direct or indirect question; in some cases
S supplied introductory information about his travel plans between the
question and the initial stage.
aLevinaon (1983~ arguea that co-referentiality, or a set of shared concepta, is not always
aufficient to establiah topical coherence. In his examplea, however, no demonatratives
were uaed and in all casea topic change markers appear, auch as "Hey" or "By the way".
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. No dialogue had a closing section (Schegloff 8e Sacks (1973)), i.e. sequences
such as A: "OK" , B: "OK" , A: "Bye" , B: "Bye" had been omitted from
the transcriptions. (See also below.)
. Dialogues were relatively short, i.e. the shortest dialogue had 3 speaking
turns and the longest had 9 turns including the initial stage.
Each dialogue consisted of two parts, the contextual part, where contextual
information was provided, and the target part, on which the subjects had to
make certain judgements. In both experiments two versions of each dialogue
were presented: the origánal one, and an edited version where information was
changed in the contextual or the target part with respect to the semantic content
of the target, or the topical relation between both parts.
The target part in the first experiment consisted of two questions, (i) and
(ii) (see the example below). One of them was put in a D-form, the other in
an I-form. In both cases question-marks were put at the end. In the second
experiment the target part only consisted of the D-form of the first experiment.
In this case the question-mark was replaced by a full stop, so that the utterance
looked like a statement by I or S. This was done because we were only intereated
in the subject's judgement about the propositional content of the utterance which
is expressed more directly in a statement than a question. All dialogues ended
after the target part, so that the subjects had no more information available
about the discourse than the dialogue participants at the moment of the target
part.
The following example shows a translation in English of two dialogues uaed
in the first experiment, an original and its edited version. The contextual part




S: Good morning, this is H. Next week I am going by
plane to Montreal, I don't know the flight number, KL
671 or KL b71. Can you tell me what time I have to
catch the train in Den Haag to be in time at
Schiphol?
I: Your ilight is KL 671.
S: Yes
I: And it will leave at 14.40.
(i~ You would like to come by train?
(ii~ Would you like to come by train?
In the second version the information that S wants to go by train to Schiphol is
removed from the contextual part:
Dialogue C2
aIn the aecond experiment, the contextual part remained the same, but the target
part was replaced by the utterance "You would like to come by train. ".
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I: Schiphol Information.
S: Hello, next week I am going by plane to Singapore, I
don't know the flight number, LH 410 or LH b10. Can
you tell me what time I have to leave Tilburg to be
in time at Schiphol?
I: Your ilight is LH b10.
S: Yes
I: And it will leave at six in the evening.
(í~ You would like to come by train?
(íi~ Would you líke to come 6y traín?
In previous experiments (Beun (1988a~ and Beun (1989~~ it was found that
certain particles could influence the interpretation of a D-form as a question.
Since the occurrence of these particles could influence the subjects' responaes,
and aince we were interested in the influence of contextual features only, in both
experiments particles like eo, well and oh were removed from the target sentences
without losing relevant information about the semantic content of the sentence.
Note that the flight numbers, cities, times and introductions were changed, al-
though the structure of the edited dialogue remains the same. This was done
to avoid that the subjects would recognize the intended differences between the
original and the edited dialogues.
5.3.2 The dialogues separately discussed
Since it will not be clear in all cases how the information in the dialogues was ma-
nipulated, let us pay some attention to each dialogue separately. A survey of the
origin of the content information and the topical development of the target part
is given in Table 5.1. The appendix provides English translations of the original
and the edited dialogues; the target part is taken from the firat experiment, so,
the declarative and the interrogative question are both represented.
Dialogue 1
In dialogue lb the information about the target was literally given in the previous
discourse. In dialogue la I commits an error and it is to be expected that I is
less certain about the answer since she failed to recover the correct day.
Dialogue 2
In dialogues 2a and 2b the relevance maxim is applicable, since I's answer should
be interpreted in the light of the previous question. Therefore, in dialogue 2a the
answer refers to arrival times on Sunday; in 2b the supposition expressed in the
target is weakened by the use of the word `possibly'.
Dialogue 3
In dialogues 3a and 3b the information is literally given by I. In dialogue 3b an
intermediate sequence about a different topic was added so that the target can
be regarded as a topic recycle.
Dialogue 4
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In dialogue 4a the information is not provided in the discourse and may come
from world knowledge of the speaker. In dialogue 4b I gives the information
that S has to check in one and a half hours before departure. Note that in the
first dialogue topic changes with respect to the previous discourse; in the second
dialogue topic continues.
Dialogue 5
In dialogue 5a I communicates that she has no information about bus services.
By quantity, however, I is supposed to give the strongest available information.
So, from this, S may infer that I also has no information about departure times
of buses early in the morning.7 In dialogue 5b no information was provided about
the content of the question.
Dialogue 6
In both dialogues no information is provided in the previous discourse. If any
information is available, it may come from world knowledge possessed by the
speaker. In dialogue 6b topic changes with respect to the discourse, in dialogue
6a topic shifts from the trip from Tilburg in general to the more specific infor-
mation about train departure times.
Dialogue 7
Dialogues 7a and 7b are similar to dialogues 2a and 2b. In dialogue 7a I's answer
refers to the arrival time of the plane in the afternoon or the next morning. In
dialogue 7b S asked only for flights in the afternoon; however, I's answer is not
likely to be meant for the plane in the afternoon since the hour of arrival (9.55)
refers to the morning. By means of the second submaxim of quantity it may
be derived that the arrival time is meant for the next morning. Note that the
dialogue takes place in the afternoon, since S opens with "Good afternoon" .
Dialogue 8
In dialogue 8a a question is asked about arrival times without mentioning the
day of arrival. In most cases the day of arrival refers to `today' by the second
submaxim of quantity. In dialogue 8b I's question seems very unlikely, unless ahe
has any evidence from the flight number that the plane arrived yesterday, and
not today or the next day. In that case, the information may come from world
knowledge.
Dialogue 9
In dialogues 9a and 96 no information is provided about S' last question. In 9b
I shows at least that she is aware that S has to take an early train.
Dialogue 10
In dialogue l0a S provides implicitly the information in the question that he or
she wants to come by train; in dialogue lOb no such information is given.
'Note that the information cannot be inferred by implication. The fact that I has no
information about bus services does not imply that I does not know whether a bus leaves
early in the morning.
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Dialogue 11
In dialogues lla and llb no information is given about S' last question. In llb,
however, S asks about buses from Eindhoven to Schiphol and therefore causes a
topical change; in dialogue lla S asks about a specific aspect of the flight and is
therefore labelled as `topic continuation'.
Dialogue 12
If I is aware that S would prefer a non-stop flight (which is usually the case)
then I would have given a more informative answer. From this S may infer by
quantity in dialogue 12b that there are no non-stop flights. In dialogue 12a the
same information is provided but S asks a question about which no information
is given in the previous discourse. Note that in both dialogues topic shifte from
indirect flights to non-stop flights.
Dialogue 13
In dialogue 13a S may infer from quantity that I provided all the necessary in-
formation. In 13b no information about S' question is provided in the previoua
discourse.
Dialogue 14
In both dialogues the information about S' last question may come from world
knowledge. Usually the schedule in the weekend is different, so one may expect
a stronger supposition about the content of the question in dialogue 14b. In
both dialogues topic shifts from the schedule `today' to the schedule during the
weekend.
Dialogue 15
In dialogue 15a I mentions one flight on Saturday and two flights on Sunday,
from which S may infer by implication that there are three flights in two days.
In dialogue 15b explicit information about the day of arrival is left out, but, by
relevance, the answer may refer to the two days mentioned before, which implies
that there are three flights (or more) in two days.
Dialogue 16
In dialogue 16a it may be inferred by quantity that there is only one flight; in
dialogue 16b I answers literally that the flight mentioned is the only flight that
day.
Dialogue 17
In dialogue 17b S asks explicitly for arrival times today and tomorrow, so we
may expect by relevance that the answer refers to both days. In dialogue 17a I
answers that there are three flights a day, from which S may infer by the second
submaxim of quantity that the answer will also count for tomorrow.
Dialogue 18
In dialogue 18a the information is provided that S has to check in one and a
half hours before departure. From this S may infer by implication that she or
he has to arrive at Schiphol about one and a half hours before departure, which
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In the first experiment the subjects were told that all dialogues were taken from
real-life telephone dialogues and they were asked to guess which form of the target
part was originally used in the dialogue, the D- or the I-form. To counterbalance
both forms, all dialogues were presented twice, so that both forms were presented
equally as (i) and (ii). An advantage of this method was that the consiatency of
the subjects' responaes could also be checked. In all, 72 dialogues (2 x 2 x 18)
were presented in the first experiment.
Experiment 2
The task of the subjects in the second experiment was to judge on a scale from 0
to 4 how certain the speaker (I or S) of the target sentence was about the content
of the sentence. Very uncertain was represented by 0, very certain by 4. Here, no
counterbalance was needed with respect to the target part, so only 36 dialogues
were presented to the subjects.
Before we discuss the results, let us first summarize the differences between ex-
perimenta 1 and 2. The target part of experiment 1 conaiated of two questiona, a
D-form and an I-form. The subjects had to indicate which of the two forma was
originally uaed in the dialogue and the total number of dialoguea presented was
72.
The target part of experiment 2 consisted of one atatement (the D-form of
experiment 1; the question mark was replaced by a full stop). The subjects had
to judge the apeaker's certainty about the content of the statement and the total
number of dialogues presented was 36.
5.4 Results
Table 5.1 shows the results for the 36 dialogues in pairs labelled a dc b. The firat
(a) always denotes the original dialogue; in the second (b) amall changea were
made. The column information shows the source of the belief about the content.
Here we have five options:8 world (knpwledge) or no inf(ormation), relevance or
quantity, and literally or implication.
The column topic indicates the topical development of the target part. Here
we have four options: cont(inuation), ahift, recycl(ing) and change.
Column ezpl indicates the percentage declarativea that were predicted by the
subjects in the first experiment (100q - 48 responses). Dialogues 2, 4, 10, 11,
13, 15, 16 and 17 showed a significant difference between the two versions in the
uae of declaratives. (In all cases X~-1 ~ 4.80, p c 0.05.) Significant differences
are indicated by `~'.
'There is one exception, however, in the first dialogue where the informant makes a
miatake. The dialogue was separated from the others because it can hardly be claaaified
in one of the other groups.
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Table 5.1: Survey of the origin of information and topical development of the
target part for the 18 pairs of dialogues. Column ezpl indicates the percentage
declarativea predicted by the subjects in the first experiment; column ezp~ shows
the mean degree of certainty scored by the subjects in the second experiment.
Dial in~ormation topie expi ; tzp8























33 1.1 . ,
58 J 3.0 .
71~ 2.4
40 . ~ 2.1
71 3.5 ~ I
67 2.9 ~
40 ~. 2.5 w
73~ 13.8~
79 1.8 ~ !
60 0.5 ~r
6 a noinfo shift 1T 3.7 w
~ b noinfo change 4 2.0 ~
7 a! relevance cont 50 3.3 ~r
b! quantity cont 42 2.6 x
8 a ~ quantity cont 48 2.5
b ~ noinfo cont 33 ~ 1.9
9 a ~ noinfo cont 2 2.3



















































92 ~ 3.6 .
29 . ; 1.5 ~
71x 1.8










71 ~ 2.9 ~
42.:1.8~1
21 w 1.9 ~
67 . i 3.4 .
48 . i 2.2 ~
77 . 2.8 . ~
83 j 3.5 ~
65 ~ 2.9 .
Context and the use of declarative questions 57
The column eap2 shows the mean degree of certainty scored by the subjects
in the second experiment on a scale from 0 to 4. Dialogues 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 10, 13,
15, 16, 17 and 18 showed a significant difference between the two versions in the
degree of certainty (sign test applied over the degree of certainty per subject; in
all casea p c 0.05.). Significant differences are indicated by `~'.
For all pairs of dialogues where both the use of declaratives and degree of
certainty showed a significant difference (dialogues 4, 10, 13, 15, 16 and 17), the
results show the same behaviour. That is, if the use of declaratives increases,
certainty also increases, and vice versa. The hypothesis that the two are un-
correlated can be rejected, with p c 0.02. (Here, the sign was applied over the







Figure 5.1: The choice of declaratives in percentagea aa a function
of the source of information.
In Figures 5.1 and 5.2 the average percentage declaratives and the average
degree of certainty are successively shown as a function of the source of informa-
tion. Literal information or information derived by implication is indicated by `L'
(Literal; number of dialogues (n) - 8), information derived from the maxims ia
indicated by `I' (Implicature; n- 12), and information derived from world knowl-
edge or no information is indicated by `N' (No information; n- 15). In both
experiments the sources of information had significantly different effects (Figure
5.1: LI: X~-1 - 18.2, p c 0.001, IN: X~-1 - 28.5, p c 0.001, LN: X~-1 - 155,
p c 0.001. Figure 5.2: LI: p c 0.001, IN: p c 0.005, LN: p c 0.001; in this
















Figure 5.2: The degree of certainty as a function of the aource of
information.
5.5 Discussion
The results indicate two ways in which the speaker's belief about the content of
the DQ is related to the use of a D-form. Firstly, the use of a D-form is signifi-
cantly related to the degree ofcertainty indicated by the subjects. When certainty
about the content increases, the use of D-forms also increases. Secondly, both the
number of D-forms and the degree of certainty show the same behaviour towards
the source of information. When we look at the dialogues separately, however,
we should be careful in our conclusions. Let us therefore consider a few dialogues
more closely.
In dialogues 5a and 5b the use of a D-form was relatively frequent in both di-
alogues, scoring 79q and 60q respectively. The score for the certainty on the
other hand is relatively low, 1.8 and 0.5 respectively. So, in this case too, D-form
and certainty show the same correlated behaviour, but why do subjects prefer
a D-form although the certainty is low compared to other dialogues? Probably
the high percentage of D-forms can be explained by the form of the target part,
which was the following sentence uttered by S:
You don't know whether a train leaves that early?
Here, a D-form may have been preferred because of politeness. The underlying
rule seems to be related to Leech's approóation maxim: "minimize dispraise of
the other" (Leech (1983)). When an I-form is used instead, the question is more
offensive, almost like:
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Don't you even know whether a train leaves that early?
Such a question would be impolite in many discourse situations. Of course a lot
depends on the sentence intonation pattern, which was not available to the sub-
jects. Another reason could be that an I-form expresses more surprise and from
the dialogue it did not follow that S had any reason to be surprised. Whatever
the explanation may be, the certainty about the propositional content of the DQ
is very low and the preference for a D-form is very high, so this case is an ex-
ception to our hypothesis that D-forms are only used in cases where certainty is
high. Note that it can easily be inferred from the declarative that the utterance
is meant as a question, because the hearer is the expert about his own knowledge.
In dialogues lla and llb we have a significant decrease in the D-form score (71q
and 2q respectively) although certainty was almost equal in both cases (1.8 and
2.1, respectively), so that a direct relation between certainty and D-form does
not seem to exist. In this case the result can be explained by an abrupt topic
change in llb. In the contextual part of both dialogues S asks which flights are
going to Helsinki. I answers the question and then S continues with the target
part (here only represented in D-form):
lla S: The duration of the fiight is aóout three houra?
llb S: I can go by óus from Utrecht to Schiphol?
Hence, in lla S continues talking about the flight mentioned by I, whereas in
llb, S starts talking about the trip from Utrecht to Schiphol. So, it seems to
be the case that, in contrast to Springorum's results, an I-form is preferred when
a speaker introduces an abrupt topic change.9 There is an important difference,
however, in the discourse situation of the two kinds of dialogues. In Springo-
rum's dialogues, a doctor is diagnosing the patient's illness. Roughly speaking,
this means that the doctor (the expert) is asking questions until he or she has
diagnosed the case;lo in our dialogues questions were asked by the information-
seeker (the non-expert). If the doctor is supposed to be the expert, he can hide
his ignorance about the outcome of the answer by asking the question in a D-
form. Therefore the form of the utterance could be determined by the discourse
situation. In all cases the question function was easily identifiable because the
doctor always `stated' something about the physical condition of the patient, like
"you haven't felt thirsty in the last few months" .
We do not have enough data, however, to verify the relation between topic
change and a less preferred use of declaratives. In the experiment there was one
case where topic recycled (dialogue 3b) and only in two other cases topic changed,
namely dialogues 4a and 6b. It is not possible to compare these directly with 11
9The similarity in the degree of certainty may be explained by the fact that in both
cases no information about the content was provided during the dialogue. This ia alao
the case in dialogues 9 and 14. Note that dialogue 6 is an extreme exception: although
the information was not provided during the dialogue, there is a significant difference in
certainty (3.7 va. 2.0).
"'Note that the same structure often occurs in natural-language human-computer dia-
logues. The computer is asking questions, according to some sort of tree-structure, until
it has enough information to provide an answer (see e.g., van Katwijk, van Nes, Bunt,
Muller and Leopold (1979)).
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because in all cases certainty decreased where the topic changed, which meana
that the decrease of certainty could be responsible for the decrease in D-forma.
In dialogue 6b the D-form is hardly used (4q) and certainty is not high (2.0).
Dialogue 4a seems to be in the middle (D-form: 40~, certainty: 2.5). In dialogue
3b, however, the D-form is used in 67q of cases and certainty is relatively high
(2.9). Therefore it seems to be the case that if an abrupt topic change occura, a
D-form is preferred where certainty is high and where the evidence comes literally
from the discourse.
It is difficult, however, to compare dialogues whích are not grouped in pairs,
because not everything can be explained from the parameters in Table 5.1. In
different dialogues entirely different inferences are usually made to arrive at some
sort of belief about the content of the statement. A useful comparison should
take account of these different inferences. Note for instance that in dialogue 6a
the highest certainty is reached (3.7) although the use of D-forms is only 17q.
On the other hand, in dialogue lla the certainty is 1.8 and the use of D-forma ia
71q. One could suggest that the belief scale is not reliable because no fixed or
clear-cut concept of óelief is involved. However, certainty increases (or decreasea)
significantly when information is added (or deleted) with respect to the content
of the utterance. (See dialogues 4, 5, 10, 15, 16, 17 and 18.) Therefore, the out-
come of the certainty scale seems reasonably reliable and useful in casea where
no information is added or deleted in the contextual part.
In the results we have seen a significant covariation between the degree of
certainty and the source of information. The information was divided into three
parts: 1. literally in the text or implication, 2. implicature and 3. world knowl-
edge or no information. Clearly, the classification should be refined in some cases
since world knowledge may cause a strong belief about the proposition expressed
in the target. An example of this can be found in dialogue 6a. Some of the
subjects confronted afterwards with the results stated that "everybody knowa
that there is a train around 11.30 from Tilburg" . Of course, world knowledge ia
influenced by the place where people live and is also culturally determined. On
the other hand, belief inferred by implication may be very low if the inference is
`too difficult' (see Noordman 8z Vonk (198?)).
It is unclear, however, why the use of declaratives in 6a is so low (17PJo). The
explanation that the information does not come from the discourse is inauffi-
cient, since the use of D-forms in, for instance, dialogue lla is very high (71oI'o).
A suggestion could be that certain syntactic constructiona are unsuitable for a
declarative question; here, "There is ..." or "There are ..." .11 Note in thia con-
nection the relatively low use of declaratives in dialogues 9a (2qo), 9b (15oI'o), 12a
(13q ) and 12b (27q) which have the same constructions.
Turning to dialogue lOb (the edited dialogue C2 from the example above), we
see that in 29~ of cases a D-form is preferred, although the information about the
content is not mentioned in the text. The degree of certainty (1.5) also suggests
that there must be some weak belief about the content. If no information is
mentioned in the text, the information must be inferred from already existing
world knowledge. The inference could run along the following lines.
"In Dutch: "Er is ..." or "Er zijn ..."
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1. S says that he wants to set out from Tilburg.
Z. S does not say how he will go to Schiphol.
3. There are only two ways to get from Tilburg to Schiphol (within a limited
time~, namely by train or by car.
4. S is probably not going by car because he knows how fast he drives and
therefore it would be easier for S than for I to determine the duration of
the travel time from Tilburg to Schiphol.
5. Therefore I thinks that S will probably go by train.
In dialogue l0a the I-form sounds more redundant, because the information
was already provided in the course of the dialogue. However, the use of an I-form
is not wrong; the I-form sounds at the most a little impolite, as if no attention
had been paid to what was said before. It can be concluded about all usea of
D-forms in questions, especially when the belief about the content comes from
certain background information, that the D-form can be replaced by an I-form
without affecting the dialogue too much. But of course not the other way around:
an I-form cannot be replaced by a D-form, without the risk of misunderstanding
the question function and the corresponding speaker's mental state.
5.6 Concluaion
From the experiments it follows that a significant relation exists between the use
of a D-form as a syntactic characteristic of a question and the speaker's belief
about the content of the question. It cannot be concluded, however, that a strong
belief automatically causes a declarative form to be used and a weak belief an
interrogative form.
A D-form is used in particular in those cases where information has already
been provided in the dialogue and where the speaker doubts certain elementa of
the information given; the function of these utterances is typically verificative. If
the information source is outside the dialogue (e.g., world knowledge~ a D-form
can always be replaced by an I-form, without affeeting the course of the dialogue.
When attention is shifted to another topic in the dialogue, the use of D-forms
decreases in those cases where belief about the content is weak. In cases of strong
belief, topic change hardly influences the use of D-forms.
Sometimes a D-form is preferred when hardly any belief about the content
of the DQ is present, especially in those cases where certain rules of politeness
conflict with the use of an I-form. These D-forms can only be used, however,
when they are semantically easy to identify as questions, so that no mistakes can
be made about the question function of the declarative.
An important question still to be answered is how the speaker's belief can
be inferred from contextual features. The inference is usually very complex,
especially when world knowledge is involved in the derivation. The inference
above, for example, where I concludes that S will probably go by train, is by
no means explicit; in this case one should also include knowledge about times,
distances, speed, cars, trains, rational behaviour, and so on. The exact inference
scheme would be very complex, which makes the prediction of a certain belief
very unreliable. Indeed, this is of no concern to the hearer; he only identifies the
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belief from the use of a declarative as a question, without bothering about the
source of the belief. But even in very simple cases, that is, when the information
is provided in the dialogue, the available formal methods of describing dialoguea
and action theory are not adequate to infer this belief.




S: Good morning. Next Monday I
want to go by plane to Paris,
I: Yes ...
S: and I have to be there at about
two o'clock in the a3ternoon.
What time do I have to be there
to arrive in time?
I: Well, the plane leaves at 11.30
and it will arrive at 13.30 and
there is another one at ...
no , (i~ You said Saturday?
(ii~ Did you say Saturday?
Dialogue 2a
I: Schiphol Inïormation.
S: Hello, can you roughly tell me
what time the planes arrive
from Munich on Sunday and
possibly on Saturday?
I: Just a moment, please ...
I: Yes, a plane arrives at 11.60.
S: (i~ That is on Sunday?




S: Good morning. Next Monday I
want to go by plane to Paris,
I: Yes ...
S: and I have to be there at about
two o'clock. What time do I
have to be there to arrive in
time?
I: Well, the plane leaves at 11.30
and it will arrive at 13.30 and
there is another one at ...
no, (i~ You said Monday?
(ii~ Did you say Monday?
Dialogue 2b
I: Schiphol Information.
S: Hello, can you roughly tell me
what time the planes arrive
ïrom Munich on Sunday and
possibly on Saturday?
I: Just a moment, please ...
I: Yes, a plane arrives at i1.b0.
S: (i~ That is also on Saturday?




S: Hi, can you tell me when planes
arrive 2rom Lyon in Amsterdam,
during the whole week?
I: Yes, just a moment ...
I: A plane arrives at 9.b5, but not
in the weekend.
S: (i) That's the whole week but not
in the weekend?
(ii) Is that the whole week óut




S: Hi, can you tell me when planes
arrive from Lyon in Amsterdam,
during the whole week?
I: Yes, just a moment ...
I: A plane arrives at 9.bb, but not
in the weekend.
S: And these are the only ilights?
I: Yea.
S: Do buses leave trom Eindhoven to
Schiphol?
I: Yes, they do.
S: (i) That was the whole week but
not in the weekend9
(ii) Was that the whole week but
not in the weekend?
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Dialogue 4a
I: Schiphol In2ormation.
S: Good morning, I would like to
know what time the planes leave
irom Amsterdam to Paris, in
three days.
I: One moment, please.
I: So, that is on Sunday. Then
there are several planes.
Shall I mention them all?
S: Yes, please.
I: There is a plane at 8.Ob, at
9.b0, at 10.2b, at 14.26 and at
17.Ob.




S: Good morning, I would like to
know what time the planes leave
írom Amsterdam to Paris, in
three days.
I: One moment, please.
I: So, that is on Sunday. Then
there are several planes. Shall
I mention them all?
S: Yes, please.
I: There is a plane at 8.Ob, at
9.b0, at 10.2b, at 14.2b and at
17.05 and you have to check in
one-and-a-hali hours betore
departure.
S: 8.Ob, 9.60, 10.2b, 14.26 and
17.Ob.
I: Yes.
S: (i~ 1 have to be at Schiphol one-
and-a-half hours before depar-
ture time 2
(ii~ Do I have to be at Schiphol
one-and-a-half hours before de-
parture time?
I: Yes.
S: (i~ 1 have to be at Schíphol one-
and-a-half houra before depar-
ture time?
(ii~ Do I have to be at Schiphol





S: Good morning, H.B. speaking.
Are there any bus services from
various places to Schiphol?
I: Yes, these are ordinary KLM
buses.
S: What time do they leave from
Eindhoven and can I use them
when I want to pick someone up
and didn't book myseli?
I: That is no problem, but I don't
have any time schedules about
buses here. In that case, you
have to call another number.
S: (i) You don't know whether they
leave early in the morning?
(ii) Don't you know whether they
leave early in the morning?
Dialogue 6a
I: Schiphol Iniormation.
S: Good morning, R.A. speaking.
Next Thursday, I would like to
go to Montreal. I don't know
the Ylight number, is that KL
671 or b71?
I: That is KL 671.
S: 671?
I: Yes.
S: And what time do I have to leave
irom Tilburg by train to catch
that ilight, do you have any
idea about that?
I: Well, your plane leaves at 14.40
and you have to check in one-
and-a-half hours before and the
trip ïrom Tilburg takes about
one-and-a-half hours. So, ii
you leave three hours beïore ...
S: (i) There is a train leaving at
11.80 from Tilburg?





S: Good morning, H.B. apeaking.
Are there any bus services írom
various places to Schiphol?
I: Yes, these are ordinary KLM
buses.
S: What time do they leave irom
Eindhoven and can I use them
when I want to pick someone up
and didn't book myselt?
I: That is no problem, they leave
every hour trom Eindhoven.
5: (i) You don't know how long they
take?




S: Good morning, R.A speaking.
Next Thursday, I would like to
go to Montreal. I don't l~ow
the ilight number, is that KL
671 or 671?
I: That is KL 671.
S: 671?
I: Yes.
S: And what time do I have to leave
írom Tilburg by train to catch
that ilight, do you have any
idea about that?
I: Well, your plane leaves at 14.40
and you have to check in one-
and-a-half hours beiore and the
trip irom Tilburg takes about
one-and-a-hali hours. So, ii
you leave three hours betore ...
S: (i) Special KLM buses leave from
Den Haag to Schiphol~
(ii) Do special KLM buses leave
from Den Haag to SchipholY
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Dialogue 7a
I: Schiphol Information.
S: Good afternoon, I have a
question about the arrival time
of planes trom Lyon. I am ex-
pecting someone who arrives this
afternoon or tomorrow. What
time do planes arrive irom Lyon?
I: Just a moment, please.
I: There is a plane at 9.bb.
S: (i~ That is tomorrow morning?
(ii~ Is that tomorrow morning7
Dialogue 8a
I: Schiphol Information.
S: Good morning, I would like to
know the arrival time oi the
plane from Nice, ilight number
KL 338.
I: (i~ That is today?




S: Good afternoon, I have a
question about the arrival time
ot planes irom Lyon. I am
expecting someone who arrives
this atternoon. What time do
planes arrive trom Lyon?
I: Just a moment, please.
I: There is a plane at 9.66.
S: (i~ That is tomorrow morning?
(ii~ Is that tomorrow morning?
Dialogue 8b
I: Schiphol Information.
S: Good morning, I would like to
know the arrival time of the
plane from Nice, flight number
KL 338.
I: (i~ That was yesterday?




S: Goo~ morning, thi8 is F.D. Next
week, Tuesday, a plane will be
leaving for Prague. That is the
KL 281 or KL 282. What time
does that plane leave?
I: You said Tuesday?
S: Yes.
I: The plane leaves at 9.25 and it
is the KL 281.
S: Then I would like to have a
connection with the train from
Tilburg. What time do I have to
catch the train in Tilburg?
I: Yes, you have to check in
one-and-a-half hours before and
the train takes about one hour
and f orty minutes.
S: (i) There is a train that leaves
that early?





S: Good morning, this is F.D. Next
week, Tuesday, a plane will be
leaving for Prague. That ia the
KL 281 or KL 282. What time doea
that plane leave?
I: You said Tuesday?
S: Yes.
I: The plane leavea at 9.26 and it
is the KL 281.
S: Then I would like to have a
connection with the train from
Tilburg. What time do I have to
catch the train in Tilburg?
I: Yes, then you have to catch an
early train. You have to be
there at about eight and the
train takes about one hour and
forty minutes.
S: (i) There is a train that leavea
that early?
(ii) Is there a train that leaves
that early?
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r~qwi~.,ue l0a~g
I: Schiphol Intormation
S: Good morning, this ia H.K. Next
week I am going by plane to
Montreal, I don't know the llight
number, KL 871 or KL 671. Can you
tell me what time I have to catch
the train in The Hague to be in
time at Schiphol?
I: Your ilight is KL 871.
S: Yes.
I: And it will leave at 14.40
(i) You would like to come by
train?




S: Hello, this is G.M. I have to go
to Helainki, trom Amsterdam. Can
you tell me which ilighta leave
next Sunday?
I: Juat a moment.
I: Yes, there are several ilights.
One that leaves at 9.10, one at
11.10 and one at 17.30.
S: (i) The fiight takes about three
houra?





S: Good morning, this is H.K. Next
week I am going by plane to
Montreal, I don't know the 2light
number, KL 871 or KL 671. Can you
tell me what time I have to leave
The Hague to be in time at
Schiphol?
I: Your ilight is KL 871.
S: Yes.
I: And it will leave at 14.40
(i) You would like to come by
train ?




S: Hello, thia i s G.M. I have to go
to Helsinki, irom Amsterdam. Can
you tell me which tlighta leave
next Sunday?
I: Just a moment.
I: Yes, there are several ílights.
One that leaves at 9.10, one at
11.10 and one at 17.30.
S: (i) I can go by bue from Eind-
hoven to Schiphol?





S: Hello, this is H.P. I have to go
to Helsinki, irom Amsterdam. Can
you tell me which ilights leave
next Sunday?
I: Just a moment.
I: Yes, there are several ilights.
One that leaves at 9.10, one at
11.10 and one at 17.30.
S: The ilight takes about three
hours?
I: You will arrive at 13.26 if you
take the first one. So that is
about four hours.
S: Four hours?
I: Yes, that's because oi the atops.
S: (à) There is also a non-stop
flight?




S: Hello, I have to pick someone up
who's arriving by plane irom
Dublin, in two days. Can you tell
me something about arrival times
oi those ilights?
I: Just a moment.
I: There ia a flight at 8.00 in the
morning and 8.46 in the evening.
S: (i) These are the only flights?




S: Hello, this is H.P. I have to go
to Helsinki, irom Amsterdam. Can
you tell me which flights leave
next Sunday?
I: Just a moment.
I: Yes, there are several ilighta.
One that leaves at 9.10, one at
11.10 and one at 17.30.
S: The ilight takes about three
hours?
I: You will arrive at 13.2b if you
take the iirst one. So that is
about iour houra.
S: Four hours?
I: Yes, that's because oi the stops.
S: (i) There ia no non-stop flight?
(ii) Is there no non-stop flight?
Dialogue 13b
I: Schiphol Iniormation.
S: Hello, I have to pick someone up
who's arriving by plane irom
Dublin, in two days. Can you tell
me something about arrival times
oi those flights?
I: Just a moment.
I: There is a ilight at 8.00 in the
morning and 8.46 in the evening.
S: (i) There are also other flights?
(ii) Are there also other flightsP
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Dialogue 14a
I: Schiphol Iniormation.
S: Hello, J. speaking. Can you




S: Hello, J. speaking. Can you
tell me what time the plane irom
Munich arrives?
I: Yes, today or ...?
S: Yes.
I: Let me see.
~: Sure.
I: There is one at 11.60, 16.b6 and
21.b0.
S: Yes, (i~ The achedule in the weekend
ia the same7




S: Hello, I would like to have some
intormation. What's the arrival
time oi airplanes from Dublin,
roughly?
I: Well, it depends on the day oi
the week ot course. What day
would you like to know?
S: Saturday and Sunday.
I: Saturday and Sunday. On Saturday
there is one at 11.46 and Sunday
at 20.Ob and 18.1b.
S: (i~ That's thrce fiights in two
days~
(ii~ Is that three fiights in two
days?
I: Yes, today or ...?
S: Yes.
I: Let me see.
S: Sure.
I: There is one at 11.60, 16.b6 and
21.b0.
S: Yes , (i) The schedule in the weekend
is di,~erent9




S: Hello, I would like to have aome
information. What's the arrával
times oi airplanes trom Dublin,
roughly?
I: Well, i t depends on the day ot
the week ot course. What day
would you like to know?
S: Saturday and Sunday.
I: There is one at 11.4b, at 20.06
and at 16.16.
S: (i~ That's three flighta in two
days~





S: Good morning, A. speaking. I
want to ask you whether you know
anything about arrival times oi
airplanes from Lyon ...
I: Sure .
S: on Friday, next Friday.
I: Juat a moment.
I: There ia a f light at 9.6b in the
morning.
S: (i~ That is the only ftight that
day?




S: Hello, D.R. apeaking. I would
like to know how many ilighta
arrive from Munich, and their
arrival time, please.
I: Juat a moment.
I: There are three tlights a day.
One that arrives at 11.b0, one at
16.b6, and one at 21.b0.
S: (i~ That is today and tomorrow?




S: Good morning, A. speaking. I
want to ask you whether you know
anything about arrival times oi
airplanea from Lyon ...
I: Sure .
S: on Friday, next Friday.
I: Just a moment.
I: There is only a ilight at 9.66 in
the morning .
S: (i~ That is the only fiight that
day?




S: Hello, D.R. speaking. I would
like to know how many tlighta
arrive today and tomorrow trom
Munich, and their arrival time,
please.
I: Just a moment.
I: There are three ilights a day.
One that arrivea at 11.60, one at
16.b6, and one at 21.60.
S: (i~ That is today and tomorrow?
(ii~ Is that today and tomorrow?
Context and t6e use of declarative questions
Dialogue 18a
I: Schiphol Information.
S: Hello this is R.J. I booked a
ilight to Los Angeles for next
week, Tuesday. I don't know, was
it KL402 or KL 601?
I: KL 601 .
S: KL 601. And what time does it
leave?
I: At 14.b0
S: How long before do I have to be
at Schiphol?
I: You have to check in
one-and-a-half hours before.
S: (i~ That means that I have to be
there around 13.80?
(ii~ Does that mean that 1 have




S: Hello this is R.J. I booked a
ilight to Los Angeles for next
week, tuesday. I don't know, was
it KL402 or KL 801?
I: KL 601 .
S: KL 601. And what time does it
leave?
I: At 14.60.
S: (i~ That means that 1 have to be
there around 18.~0?
(ii~ Does that mean that I hnve
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abstract
Communicative acts in natural language dialogues can be regarded as intentional acts
performed by a dialogue participant to influence the relevant aspects of the mental state of
a recipient. In this paper a framework is discussed for deriving the beliefs and intentions
of a speaker from the perforinance of a certain act. To this end, the communicative act
is expressed in terms of prosodic and textual features of the utterance and connected
by means of default rules to the conditions that must be fulfilled by a speaker in order
to perform the act felicitously. These conditions are expressed in terms of the beliefs
and intentions of the speaker and tnay be compared with 5earle's felicity conditions on
speech acts. It is argued, though, that some felicity conditions can be derived from a
formalization of geueral principles of rational and cooperative behaviour in information
dialogues.
6.1 Introduction
In Levinson (1983) it is argued that a promising approach to speech act theory
would be one in which speech acts are characterized in terms of their context-
changing effects. In this approach (Isard (1975); Stalnaker (1978); Gazdar (1981);
Bunt (1989a)) context is limited to mental states of the participants (in terms of
beliefs, expectations, wants, intentions, etc.) and an illocutionary act is taken as
a function that changes one context into another. For instance, the performance
of a promise can cause a change in a speaker's `mental' state from one in which
he is not committed to a certain future act (context K) into one in which he
is (context K'). An order changes a context from one in which a hearer ia not
required by a speaker to do a future act into one in which the hearer is so required.
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In Bunt (1989a) the idea of a context change is formalized and the effects of
a communicative actl (CA) in a dialogue situation are represented as follows:
(1) K-~ KZ, Ky ~~ K' -~ K2, K~ ~
where Kz and K~ are the respective new mental states of the agents x and y
resulting from the communicative act. The CA is viewed as a function from
a context ( i.e. the context before the performance of the act) to a new con-
text ( i.e. the context after the performance of the act). In other words,
CA(K) - CA(C Kx, K~ 1) -c K2, Ky ~- K', which agrees with Gazdar's
proposal (Gazdar ( 1981)), where illocutionary acts are partial functions from
contexts into contexts.
Although the `context-change' approach of speech acts seems to offer an attrac-
tive formal treatment of inental state changes of dialogue participants, there are
still many problems to be solved (see e.g., Levinson (1983)). In this paper, we will
concentrate on one of these problems, namely how relevant parts of the speaker's
mental state can be linked to the linguistic features of the utterance and how
a hearer can recognize this state from the speaker's utterance. To answer these
questions, we will first go into Bunt's theory in more detail and we will illustrate
certain aspects of the theory. In line with Bunt, we will assume that recognition
of the act implies recognition of its felicity conditions (i.e. the conditions that
must be satisfied by a speaker's mental state in order to perform the act). Next, a
belief and intention framework will be sketched to identify the felicity conditions
of a certain utterance from its prosodic, textual and contextual features. This
framework is based on an application of default rules and is amply inspired by
Perrault's (1989) work on an application of default logic in speech act theory.
We will presume that a speaker's intention is always to make something true
in a certain state of affairs. For instance, a speaker wants a hearer to believe a
proposition or wants a hearer to believe that the speaker wants to know some-
thing. To achieve this, a speaker plans an utterance (see e.g., Appelt (1981);
Pollack (1989) on the planning of utterances) and tries to compose a sentence
with certain syntactic and semantic characteristics.
The other side of this phenomenon is, how can a hearer infer the intentions
of the speaker? In other words, what strategy does a hearer use to discover the
speaker's intentions from an utterance and its circumstances. Previous studies
(e.g., Allen 8c Perrault (1980); Kautz (1989)) usually concentrate on the recog-
nition of the speaker's plan, in terms of goals and future actions, but are hardly
based on linguístic knowledge. In this paper it is not our aim to give a plan-based
analysis of the recognition of the goals of a speaker; instead, we will concentrate
on the identification of a communicative act or, more precisely, a speaker's in-
tended information transfer, from the linguistic features of the utterance.
' The notion of `communicative act' is takeii frotn Allwood (1976~ as opposed to `speech
act' to broaden the interactive tnedia.
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6.2 Communicative acts as context-changing func-
tions
In Bunt's theory (1989a), in line with Gazdar ( 1981) and Searle ( 1969), a com-
municative function is applied to a(propositional) content c, yielding a com-
municative act: CF(c) - CA. Successful communication is accomplished if the
felicity conditions, FCc,y(c), of the communicative act are recognized by the re-
cipient and if the conditions become mutual belief (MB),2 for if the recipient
understands the communicative act, he knows the preconditions that go with it
and he therefore believes that the speaker's mental state fulfills the conditions to
perform the act. If, on the other hand, the speaker believes that he is observed
by the recipient, he will assume, if there is no evidence to the contrary, that the
recipient believes that the speaker fulfills the preconditions, and so on. So, the
added information after the performance of the speech act is:
(2) MBx,vFCcA(c)
That is, after the communicative act CA with preconditions FCCA(c), the agents
x and y mutually believe that the preconditions hold. In other words, what an
utterance communicates is its felicity conditions.
As we have seen already, CA was treated as a function from the `old' context
to the `new' context:3 CA(K) - K'. The contextual change caused by the speech
act CA can be written as:
(3) CA(K) - update(K, {MBx,~FCCA(c)})
Here an update function is introduced which contains two arguments: a. the old
mental states of the agents and b. a set of beliefs with which the old mental state
should be updated. Bunt argues that, in general, consistency maintenance and
revision of inental states should be taken into account (see also Bunt (1989b)),
but that in the simplest case these beliefs can be added to the already present
state, that is:
(4) CA(K) -~Kx U {BxMBx ~FCCA(c)},
K~ U {ByMBZ,yFCcA(c)} ~
Simply adding propositions to a previous context is inadequate in most cases,
since new propositions can influence old ones. Clearly, some of these propositions
play an active part during the dialogue ( `memory') and some are more volatile.
This can be modelled by the addition of sequential or temporal aspects (see
section 6.5.1).
Bunt gives a taxonomy of communicative functions, based on three different
types of intentions that may underly communicative acts in information dia-
logues: 1. a speaker wants to know something, 2. a speaker wants to make
2Buiit suggests building in two kinds of belief, a strong and a weak version (respec-
tively, know and suspect), to describe the effects on the mental states of the participants.
Since tlie difference between these two kinds of belief plays no role in this section, they
will fuse into one modal belief operator (B~.
3It should be noted that CA is a partial function, because it can only be applied to
contexts where one of the participants fulfills the preconditions to perform the apeech
act.
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known something, or 3. a speaker knows that the hearer wants to know some-
thing. The functions are represented in a hierarchical structure, indicating that
one function is more specific than the other in terms of felicity conditions. For
instance, a check is more specific than a yes~no-question because the check has
the extra condition that the speaker has a supposition about the content of the
utterance.
An important issue still to be addressed is how linguistic features of utterancea
correspond to communicative functions. An obvious linguistic candidate that dis-
closes the function is the appearance of an explicit performative in the utterance.
In natural dialogue, however, performatives are rarely used and it is not to be
expected that a one-to-one relation will ever be found between sentence features
and the meaning of performative verbs (see e.g., Huddleston (1976); Levinson
(1983)); the relation will especially be hampered by the influence of contextual
features.
Here in line with Cohen and Levesque (1989b), we will avoid illocutionary
labelling and attempt to determine the attitudes directly from the linguistic fea-
tures of the utterance. Communicative functions will be expressed in terms of
observable features of the utterance and only those features will be taken into
account that contribute to revealing particular attitudes of the speaker, in terms
of belief and intentions, towards a certain proposition. For that purpose, a frame-
work will be introduced to represent beliefs, intentions and actions of an agent.
Communicative acts will be considered as `normal' actions, i.e. intentionally per-
formed to change certain aspects of the world. To represent the consequences
of a communicative act, we will use Perrault's application of default logic to
speech act theory. In particular, default rules will be used to include contextual
dependency and to reason without complete knowledge.
6.3 A framework for representing communicative
acts
6.3.1 A definition of the language
To represent that an agent performs actions and has certain beliefs and intentions,
we will introduce a language L. The expressions DOxa, Bxp, WBxp, and Ixp are
of type Proposition. They are read as `x performs action a', `x believes that p',
`x has a weak belief that p' and `x intends to make true that p', respectively.
a is of type Action, Obs(x) is of type Action denoting the action of observing
the agent x. Weak belief ( WB) is included to express people's uncertainty about
some proposition and is mainly used in relation to verifications (Bunt (1989a);
Beun (1988b)). Bxp will be used as a shorthand notation for BZp v Bs~p, and
can be read as `x has a belief about p'.
We will assume that belief (B) possesses the properties of the standard weak
S5 axioms (see e.g., Hughes 8z Cresswell (1968)):
Consistency ~ Bxp -~ ~B2~p
Closure I- BZpBcBz(p -~ q) -~ BZq
Negative Introspection ~- ~Bxp -~ Bx~B2p
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Positive Introapection ~ Bzp --~ BxBZp
These rules are closed under the principle:
Necessitation If ~ p then B2p
where p is an axiom of (standard) propositional logic.
Note that the axiom Bxp --~ p is not included because we want to make
it possible that an agent has incorrect information about the `real' world. To
indicate a common belief of two agents, we will use mutual belief MBxyp (which
is equivalent to Bzp dc Byp da BzByp de ByBxp 8e ...). Note that a one-sided
version BMBxyp (equivalent to Bzp dc BxByp de BxByB2p 8L ...) can be expressed
in terms of mutual belief when the `Closure' axiom and `Necessitation' rule are
assumed:
(5) BMBzyp ~ Bxp8cB2MBxyp
The intention operator (I) is introduced, as opposed to `desire' or `want',
to concentrate on the goal-directed behaviour of the participants in information
dialogues. If S intends to do communicative act a, then S has decided to do a,
which is clearly not the case with a desire. Bratman (1989) argues that desirea
can be inconsistent with someone's belief, but that intentions are always assumed
to be consistent. He distinguishes two concepts of intention: first, to characterize
an agent's actions, and second, to characterize an agent's mental state. In our
framework, intention should be considered as the decision of an agent to achieve a
certaín state of affairs, and can thus be seen as a description of an agent's mental
state (namely the intended state).
We will assume that a rational agent does not intend to do superfluous acts.
In other words, if an agent intends to achieve a situation in which p is true, he
does not believe that p is already true. The axiom expressing this (BI1) can
be seen as an extreme form of Allwood's principle of adequacy: "Try to act as
adequately and efficiently as possible to achieve your intended purpose" (Allwood
(1976): pp. 49). It would be very inadequate of an agent if he tried to achieve a
certain goal which he believed has already been achieved.
Also, intentions are supposed to be consistent with the agent's belief; so, if
the agent intends to achieve a situation in which p is true and he believes that
from p follows q he does not intend to achieve a situation in which q is not true
(BI2). Intentions and belief are related in the following axioms:
BI1 ~ IzP -' ~BxP
BI2 I- IzpdcBx(P ~ 9)
BI3 ~ IzP --~ Bx IxP
BI4 I- ~IxP --~ Bx~IxP
BI3 and BI4 are added to express the agent's introspective view on his intentions.
Moreover, we will assume that if the agent intends to achieve a situation in which
p is true and intends to achieve a situation in which q is true, this equals the
agent's intention to achieve a situation in which both p and q are true.
I1 F- IxpBclxq H IZ(P~4)
Note that by means of rule BI2, an agent will never intend both p and ~p
(IZP~Bz(P ~ P) ~ ~Ix~P).
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Now, let us define how the linguistic features of the communicative act should be
built into the framework. By considering CAs as special instances of actions, the
performance by x of the communicative act CA can be expressed as DOy(CA).
In line with Bunt (1989a) a CA will be viewed as a communicative function
(CF) applied to a semantic content (cont). To avoid unnecessary complexity, the
semantic content will be restricted here to propositions only.
(6) CA : Application(fun: CF, arg: cont)4
A communicative function is denoted by a tuple called function atructure (Fstruc),
consisting of the utterance features: sentence type (sentt), particle (part) and
prosodics (pros).
(7) CF : Fstruc(sentt: s, part: pa, pros: pr)
Fstruc(sentt: s, part: pa, pros: pr) denotes a function which can be applied to
propositions to yield an action. In the examples below, sentence type, particles
and prosodics will be restricted to the following values:5
(8) sentence type E {declarative, interrogative}
particle E {wel, dus, nil}
prosodics E {final[~-], final[-], nil}
The value `nil' indicates that information about a particular value is absent. The
values `final[-F]' and `final[-]' indicate a final rise and fall, respectively, in the
intonation pattern of the utterance. If prosodic features are not available, for
instance in written discourse, `final[f]' and `final[-]' may indicate punctuation,
here `question mark' and `full stop', respectively. It should be mentioned, how-
ever, that this is a simplification, since the functions of the prosodic markers and
punctuation in natural discourse often do not agree. Actually, this would force
us to introduce a new field in the function structure; for simplicity, we will leave
that out here.
For the same reason, we will not allow the possibility of more than one particle
in a sentence. Particles may carry prosodic information; in cases where the
meaning of a particle depends on its accentuation, `[f]' or `[-]' will be added to
indicate whether it is accentuated or not. If no information is available about the
prosodics of the particle, the extra field will simply be left out.
CA is of type action; D02(CA) is true if x performs the communicative act
CA. For instance, if speaker S utters the sentence "Só, John is drunk.", this will
be represented by the following expression:




`The notation is taken from Bunt (1985) and is principally used to ahow the internal
structure of the expression.
SIf necessary, more values can be used to express the act, e.g. the occurrence of
performative verbs. In the examples that follow, we will use only the valuea repreaented
111 (8).
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where p is the proposition that John is drunk, represented, for example, by
~x(Drunk'(x)8cx - John'). Below, a shorthand notation will be used. For
instance, ( 9) will be represented as:
(10) DOS(C dec, so[-{--], final[-], p))
6.3.2 Perrault's theory of defaults and speech acts
In Perrault (1989) a default logic (due to Reiter (1980)) is introduced to specify
speech act consequences. Consequences from an utterance can be inferred only as
long as they they do not contradict the context of the utterance. If, for instance,
a speaker utters a declarative with content p then the hearer can come to believe
that p is true as long as he cannot find any proof for the contrary (e.g., the hearer
believes not p at the moment of uttering, or the hearer believes that the speaker
is lying or ironical). An advantage of this approach is that consequences can be
inferred without having to specify all the possible (counter-)arguments.
A default theory consists of a set of default rules D and a set of assumptiona W
of well-formed formulas (for instance, in our language L). Perrault uses so-called
normal default rules only, which are of the form:
p:Mg
9
where p is the prerequisite and q the consequent of the rule, `Mq' expreases that
q is possible given a certain set of beliefs. Normal defaults are abbreviated as
p~ q, and intended to mean that if p is believed, q is believed as long as q is
consistent with what is believed. Default rules should be seen as rules of infer-
ence, like Modus Ponens, rather than axioms. The closure of a default theory is
called an extension and contains: 1. the assumptions W, 2. the closure under
logical consequence, and 3. the consequents of the default rules as long as the
extension does not contain the negation of the consequent. (For more details, see
Reiter (1980).)
A temporal aspect is added to propositional attitudes; for instance, Bx,tp means
that x believes p at time t. The addition of time motivates two new axioms ex-
pressing that agents remember their beliefs over time (Memory) and continue to
hold them (Persistence).
Persiatence ~ BZ,tf1Bx,tp ~ Bx,ttlp
Memory 1- BZ,tP ~ Bx,ttiBx,tP
The notion of communication is explicitly built into the `Observability' axiom ex-
pressing that if agent y performed an action a and another agent x was observing
y, x believes that y was performing the act.
Observability 1- DOv,taBcDOz,tOBS(y) --~ Bx,tt1DOy,ta
Formally, x and y need not be different; however, communication is only achieved
when x and y differ. The axiom is oversimplified because agents rather than
actions are observed. This is of no concern here.
Perrault also suggests two default rules. Belief from another agent will be
taken over as long as this new belief is consistent with the ones already held
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(Belief transfer), and the content of a declarative utterance is believed to be true
(Declarative rule).
Belief transfer Bz,tB~,tp ~ Bx,tp
Declarative rule DOZ,tp. ~ BZ,tP
Here p. is the action of uttering a declarative with content p. Default rules are
closed under belief by a meta-rule:
if p~ q is a default rule, then so is BZ,tp ~ Bx,t9
Now, Perrault is able to make predictions for the update of the existing context
when the usual preconditions of speech acts do not obtain (e.g., in cases of lies
or irony). Important to note is that the context will be updated by inferencea
based on the utterance and its previous context. For instance, suppose that a
speaker S utters a declarative with content p, and a hearer H, who observea S,
believes that S is lying. In that case, the default inference from the `Declarative
rule' that S believes p will be blocked, since H believes that S believes not p and
therefore H will not come to believe that p is the case.
The (non-monotonic) default rules in Perrault's theory seem to correspond to
a formalization of standard pragmatic inferences. In non-monotonic reasoning,
inferences can be made without complete knowledge of the circumstances. In
a classical monotonic system, we could for instance have the following axiom:
DOx,tp.Bz~LY(x) -~ Bz,tp, (a speaker believes the content of an uttered declara-
tive unless he is lying). From this axiom it can only be inferred that the speaker
believes p if it is explicitly known that the speaker is not lying. By contrast, in
non-monotonic reasoning the consequent can be inferred unless it can be proved
that the hearer is lying; therefore, the consequent can be inferred in the absence
of any belief about the speaker's lying.
In Appelt 8t Konolige (1988) an alternative proposal is put forward which
replaces Reiter's default logic by an extended version of Moore's autoepistemic
logic (Moore (1985)) in which the rules generate hierarchical seta of extensions to
incorporate preferences among defaults. We will also use a notion of priority of
defaults which differs from Appelt dz Konolige's proposal in that priority will be
built into the default rules themselves, where Appelt dz Konolige build priority
into a hierachical structure of subtheories.
6.4 Mental state and utterance features
In this and the following section we would like to discuss how linguistic and
contextual features of utterances reveal certain aspects of the mental state of
the speaker. The following linguistic information will be considered: sentence
type, particles and prosodics. Contextual information will be restricted to the
belief among the dialogue participants as to who is the expert on the topic of the
utterance. This belief plays an essential role in the determination of a declarative
as a question.
We will assume that the participants behave rationally and cooperatively. To
express this behaviour in our language L, we will formalize the Gricean maxims
of `quality' and `quantity' (Grice (1975)) using the previously defined axioms and
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newly introduced default rules. An important advantage of formalizing these
maxims is that the FCs of a particular communicative act can be drastically
simplified.
It was already discussed that no one-to-one relation has been found between
linguistic features and illocutionary acts. The same is true of linguistic features
and mental states. For instance, depending on the circumstances, a declarative
with content p can be used if the speaker has the intention to let the hearer believe
that p is true, or a speaker may have the intention to let the hearer believe that
the speaker believes p, or a speaker may even have the intention to know the
value of p.
Here, default rules will play an important role, because they enable us to
express that in uttering a declarative a speaker usually intends the hearer to
believe its content. Only in cases where it can explicitly be proved that this is
not the case will this interpretation be rejected. Therefore, we will speak of a
preferred set of felicity conditions as a mental state description rather than as
a direct or indirect interpretation of a communicative act. Different FCs will be
hierarchically linked to the linguistic features of the utterance. Although the
preferred set of a simple declarative (i.e., of DOS(G dec, nil, nil, p~)) is closely
related to its usual direct interpretation, it is important to note that we do not
take the view that less preferred sets have to be considered as indirect (Searle
(1975)). Searle calculates the indirect act from the direct one; here, we will see
that if a preferred set of FCs is inconsistent with, for instance, prior knowledge,
the set is rejected by means of the application of inference rules in a certain order
before it is even calculated.
6.4.1 Sentence type and felicity conditions
The question is now which preferred set of FCs can be related to the declarative
or interrogative sentence type. Before we try to answer this, let us make two
assumptions. Firstly, we will assume that a simple declarative agrees with a
statement interpretation and a simple interrogative (i.e., DOS(c int, nil, nil, p~
)) with a question interpretation. Secondly, we will assume that in all cases
the speaker has the intention that the hearer should believe something: if the
utterance is declarative, the speaker intends the hearer to believe the content of
the utterance;~ if interrogative, the speaker intends the hearer to believe that the
speaker wants to know something.
The interrogative case partly agrees with Searle's (1969) FCs on questioning.
In this paper, the `preparatory' condition on questioning, viz. that the speaker
does not know the answer, follows from the axiom IB1: if x has the intention to
make p true, x does not belief that p is true at that moment.
(11) jxP ~ ~BxP
Now, if x is replaced by S and p by Bsp, i.e. the speaker has the intention to
know the value of p (ISBsp), it follows from (11) that S does not believe that S
believes whether p:
~This choice is based on results from earlier recorded dialogues where information was
exchanged about the arrival and departure tiines of aircraft and trains ( see e.g., Beun
8a Bunt (1987)~. In other situations, it may be preferred that, for instance, the speaker
intends the hearer to believe that the speaker believes that p.
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(12) Isgsp --~ ~BsBsP
From the consequence of (12) it can easily be proved by means of the `belief'
axioms that the speaker has no belief about p (~Bsp) and therefore Searle's
preparatory condition is superfluous.
Just as in the case of an interrogative (or question) the speaker's ignorance
about p can be inferred from aspects of the agent's rational behaviour (axiom
IB1), the speaker's belief that p is true can be inferred from the Gricean maxim
of quality (Grice (1975)) in the case of a declarative. This is expressed in (13):
if S has the intention to let H believe that p is true, S believes that p is true by
default.
(13) Quality ISBHp ~ Bsp
A derived form of the quantity maxim follows from (11), i.e. a speaker does not
transfer information that is already known to the hearer.
(14) Quantity ISBHp -~ ~BSBHp
Or, with contraposition, if a speaker believes that the hearer believes p, the
speaker will never have the intention to make true that the hearer believes p.
Now, the following preferred set of felicity conditions holds in the case of a simple
declarative and a simple interrogative:
declarative: FCd(p) - IsBxp
interrogative: FC;(p) - IsBxIsBsP
6.4.2 The application of default rules
We will now show how default rules can be applied to determine the transferred
package of felicity conditions. In many cases, a crucial role is played by the
priorities of default rules. We will say that:
Default rule ~ has priority over rule ~i iff the consequent of ~i can be
inferred only in case the consequent of ~ is false.
For instance, it can easily be verified that rule (15a) has priority over rule (15b)
and that both (15a) and (15b) have priority over (15c):
(15a) p ~ q
(15b) p8e~q ~ r
(15c) ~qdz~r ~ m
We formulate default rules where the communicative act is represented in the
prerequisite of the rule, the preferred package of felicity conditions in the conse-
quent. So, if a speaker utters a simple declarative or interrogative, respectively,
it can be inferred by default that the felicity conditions FCd(p) or FC;(p) hold.
(16) DOs(c dec,nil,nil,p~) ~ IsBHp
(17) DOs(c int, nil, nil, p 1) ~ ISBxIsBsP
In the expressions below the following abbreviations will be used:
STATE - ISBHp
QUE - IsBxIsBsP
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Empirically, a`statement' interpretation of declaratives is preferred; however, a
declarative can be used for questioning even without any overt question indica-
tors. In Beun (1989) it was shown that no more than 50q of Dutch declarative
questions in spoken dialogues possessed an overt question indicator. Therefore
it is desirable to be able to infer both ínterpretations, with a preference for the
statement, i.e. a declarative is interpreted as a statement as long as no evidence
exists to the contrary. Only if it can be proved that ~IS Bqp can the `ques-
tion' function be chosen and only then should the `statement' interpretation be
rejected.
In Beun (1988b), it was shown experimentally that questions in Dutch with a
declarative sentence type usually have a verificative function, i.e. apart from the
usual felicity conditions of the interrogative (FC;(p)) the speaker intentionally
communicates that he suspects that p (W Bsp). Now, the second interpretation
of the declarative can be written as:
(16a) DOS(c dec,nil,nil,p ~)Bc~STATE ~ QUEdeISB1YWBsp
To infer the consequent of (16a) it should explicitly be proved that the apeaker
does not have the intention to let the hearer believe that p is true, which is always
true if the consequent of (16) is rejected. This implies that (16) has priority over
(16a).
Depending on the discourse situation other functions may be found as well,
for instance, marking a topic change ( Springorum ( 1986)) or showing politeness
(Beun ( 1988b)), although the verificative function is preferred. If the speaker has
no suspicion about the content of the declarative question a third default rule
could be applied:
(16b) DOS(c dec,nil,nil,p 1)8c~STATEdc~ISBHWBsp ~ QUE
Again, the consequent of (16b) can be inferred only if the consequents of (16)
and (16a) cannot be inferred and therefore the latter have priority.
It is important to note that the inference in (16) cannot be made by ordinary
implication. (18) as a replacement is problematic because ~QUE must explicitly
be proved to infer the consequence, which is impossible in most realistic cases.
(18) DOS(c dec, nil, nil, p 1)Bc~QUE -~ STATE
Also (19) is unacceptable, because in all cases STATE would be inferred if the
speaker utters a declarative, even if it is already known by the hearer that
---,STATE.
(19) DOS(c dec, nil, nil, p)) -~ STATE
6.4.3 Other linguistic features
Final rise
An important feature revealing the question function of a declarative ia a final
rise in intonation, although not all declaratives with a final rise are meant as
questions (Geluykens (1987)). Most declaratives wíth a final rise can be given
a question interpretation; only in those cases where it can be proved that the
utterance is not a question will a statement interpretation be selected. This can
be expressed by the following default rules:
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(20a) DOS(c dec,nil, final[-}-],p 1) ~ QUEBcISB~yWBsp
(20b) DOS(C dec, nil, final[f],p 1)Bc~QUE ~ STATE
In this case the meaning of the final rise is expressed in the change of priority of
the default rules from statement to question interpretation.
The particle `dus' (`so')
In Beun (1988a) it was demonstrated that if the Dutch particle dus (so) was
added to an utterance which was interpreted as a statement in the absence of
the particle7 (no punctuation or prosodic information being available), the ad-
dition of the particle turns the utterance interpretation into a question. The
presence of the particle therefore turns the priority from statement to question
interpretation.
(21a) DOS(c dec, dus, nil, p )) ~ QUEBcISBHW Bsp
(21b) DOS(C dec,dus,nil,p 1)dc~QUE ~ STATE
The meaning of the particle is also hidden in the application of the default rules.
A further analysis of dus will not be pursued, since our framework is far from
sufficient to account properly for the information that can be expressed by the
particle.
The particle `wel'
This example shows how the difference between an accentuated and non-
accentuated use of a particle can be expressed in the consequent of the default
rules. In Abraham (1984) more than 15 different meanings of the Dutch particle
wel are described, depending on its use in interrogatives, declaratives, stressed,
unstressed and so on. A subset will be selected and adapted to the framework
here.
A speaker indicates intentionally in a declarative sentence with accentuated
wel and final fall, in addition to his belief concerning the proposition p, the belief
that the hearer believes not p:
(22a) DOS(c dec,wel[-~], final[-],p ~) ~ STATEBcISBHBSBH~p
If a final rise is present in the utterance, the utterance gets a question interpre-
tation. The speaker adds intentionally to QUE his belief that the hearer believes
that p is true, that the speaker has a weak belief that p is true and that the
speaker believed before that not p. ( To indicate the latter proposition we will
use the expression Be f ore(Bs~p).8)




'Actually, `statement' is a simplification. The subjects were asked to decide whether
the utterance was a questioci or aii answer. Hence, `statement' agrees with an `answer'
interpretation.
gA more extensive treatment of temporal aspects is desirable, but this is beyond the
scope of this paper.
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In this case the difference in the interpretations of the interrogative and declar-
ative sentence type is too subtle to represent in our framework. Therefore, both
interpretations are considered as being equal:
(22c) DOS(c int,wel[f~, final[f],p)) ~QUEÓc
IS BH ( BS BHP~
W BSp8z
Be f ore(Bs~p))
If the partícle is not accentuated in the interrogative case, the speaker adds to
QUE that the speaker suspects that not p and that the speaker believed before
that p is true.




In this connection a note should be made on the use of particles. In some cases
a particle indicates how the proposition should be interpreted in a certain uni-
verse of discourse (so-called sentence particles; see van de Auwera da Vandeweghe
(1984)); in other cases a particle focusses on certain aspects of the proposition
(focua particles). In this section we concentrated on the first, i.e. on particles that
concern the whole proposition. Focus particles change the proposition and one
has to take the logical form of the proposition into account to obtain the result of
the added particle. For instance, `too' in "John is drunk too" may indicate that,
besides John, there is someone else who is drunk. In this case the particle does
not influence the attitude towards the proposition but the proposition itself, and
it would therefore be incorrect to place it in the communicative function.
6.5 Communicative effects and the influence of con-
text
In the previous section we have linked the utterance features to a speaker's men-
tal state by means of default rules and with that, we have indirectly defined the
felicity conditions that should be fulfilled to perform a particular linguistic act.
From the observation of the act a recipient is able to determine these conditions.
So far, however, nothing has been said about the influence of contextual informa-
tion and the communicative effects on the mental states of both dialogue partners
after the performance of the act. In describing these effects we will use Perrault's
`observability' axiom, so that communication is explicitly built into the axioms.
6.5.1 The addition of time
The introduction of temporal aspects in the observability axiom is inevitable,
since the omission would lead to unintentional blocking of certain default con-
sequents. Suppose, for instance, that the two agents S and H mutually observe
themselves and each other and that S utters a simple declarative. If time were
not built in, this would result, among other inferences, in the following:
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(23) DOSOBS(H)dcDOHOBS(S) -~ BHDOSOBS(H)ác
BSDOHOBS(S)
(24) DOs(C dec, nil, nil, p ~)ótDOSOBS(S) -~
BSDOs(c dec, nil, nil, p))
From the consequent of (24) and the second conjunct of the consequent of (23)
it can be inferred by default that BSBHp.9 From the consequent of (24) it can
also be inferred that BSISBHp. Now the default rule of `quantity' commits us to
the default inference that if the speaker intends to let the hearer believe that p is
true (ISBHp), the speaker believes that the hearer does not believe that p is true
(Bs~B~yp), which is inconsistent with the inference that the speaker believes that
the hearer believes that p is true (BSBHp). Because of the inconsistency some
of the default inferences will be blocked, although intuitively both inferences are
true, except that `Bs~BHp' comes before the performance of the communicative
act and `BSBHp' after. In other words, contezt has changed and therefore the
previous and the new state should be carefully separated.
Temporal aspects were already built into Perrault's framework by adding time
indices to the formulas. Here, the inclusion of time-dependent states commits us
to adjustments of the FCs, since agents behave rationally ( and therefore believe
in causality) and they do not intend to achieve states which they believe are
impossible to achieve (Bratman ( 1989)). Hence, agents do not believe that the
effects of their acts will appear before the acts have been performed.
Here, time to is defined as the time point just before the communicative act
and tl is the point just after the act.lo DOx,t~,a means that z started to perform
act a at time to and finished the act at time tl. So, the length of the interval
between to and tl depends on the duration of the communicative act. In the
case of a declarative with content p, the speaker does not intend that the hearer
believes p before the act is finished, i.e. before time tl. Also, in case of an
interrogative, it can never be the intention of the speaker to believe p before
t2i since the hearer can only give the answer after time tl. This results in the
following adjustments of the felicity conditions of the simple declarative and the
simple interrogative:
declarative: FCd,t„(P) - Is,t~,Bx,tlp
interrogative: FC;,t„(p) - Is,t„Bx,t, Is,t„ Bs,e,P
By means of the `observability' axiom, it can be inferred that, if a speaker per-
forms act CA at time to and is observed by the hearer, the hearer believes that
the speaker did so:
(25) DOs,t„(CA)BtDOy,t„OBS(S) ~ BH,t,DOs,t„(CA)
By means of the closure rule for defaults it can be inferred from the consequence
of (25) that the hearer believes (by default) at time tr that the felicity conditions
were fulfilled at time to: BH,t, FCcA,t„ ( p). If mutual observability is assumed the
extension contains, among other inferences, the mutual belief by S and H at time
'In tlie derivation the `belief transfer' rule is applied.
"'It should be stressed, however, that the tiine indices in our framework are primarily
meant to diatinguish different states and are far from sufficient to deacribe precisely the
temporal structure of the actions and tlie resulting effects as they take place during a
dialogue.
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tl that the felicity conditions hold: MBs,x,t1FCcA,t~(P). (See Perrault (1989)
for a more extensive discussion on how these inferences are derived.)
6.5.2 The influence of contextual knowled~e
In this subsection we will concentrate on an example where a simple declarative
is interpreted as a question under the influence of contextual features.
In Beun ( 1988a) it was discussed that (26) is an important consideration in
determining whether a declarative utterance U was used as a question.
(26) MBs,HExpertH(topic(U))
That is, it is mutually believed by speaker S and hearer H that H is the expert on
the topic of the utterance. It was experimentally verified that utterances which
fulfill these conditions ( like "You want to go by plane" or "You know what time
it is" ) are usually interpreted as questions. A precise definition of the notions
`expert' and `topic' was omitted and will also be left out in this paper. One can
imagine, however, a natural language machine which has to supply information
about arrival times of aircraft, which is instructed that it is mutually believed
that the machine is the expert about its data base, and where the topic of the
data base is the arrival times of aircraft.
The following axiom expresses that if a speaker performs a simple declarative
and it is mutually believed that the hearer is the expert on the propositional
content p of the declarative,ll then it is not the intention of the speaker that the
hearer believes that p is true.
(27) MBs,H,t„ExpertH(topic(p))BtDOs t„(C dec, nil, nil, p 1) -~
~Is,to BH,t,P
Now, suppose that it is initially believed that S and H observe each other and
that the hearer believes that it is mutually believed that the hearer is the expert
on the proposition p(the first conjunct of (27)). If a speaker utters a simple
declarative with content p ( the second conjunct of (27)), it can be inferred that
the speaker does not intend the hearer to believe that p is true ( the consequence
of (27)). Since the default consequent of (28) will be rejected, a less preferred
interpretation will be chosen, namely the verification interpretation in (29):
(28) DOs,t„(C dec, nil, nil, p~) ~ Is,t„Btl,t~P
(29) DOs,t„(c dec, nil, nil, p~)de ~Is,t~,Bx,t,p ~
Is,t„ Bx,t, (Is,t„ Bs,t,PdcW Bs,t„P)
6.6 Discussion
The main problem to be solved in this paper was to find a formalism for de-
scribing how linguiatic features of utterances could transfer information about a
speaker's mental state to a recipient. Therefore an utterance was taken as a com-
municative act which figures in a framework of default rules. In line with Bunt
"For reasons of simplicity, we will assume that the hearer is the expert on the content
p of the utterance U, and not, as indicated in (26), the expert on the topic of U.
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(1989a) the communicative act was defined as the application of a communica-
tive function to a propositional content. The communicative function consiated
of those features that contributed to revealing a speaker's attitudes towards the
content of the utterance. Bunt's theory and the one presented in this paper are
aimed at different problems, though.
Our view concerns an identification problem; Bunt attempts to define com-
municative acts as changes in the mental state of both speaker and hearer and
formalizes the act as a function from context to context, in terms of the felicity
conditions of the act and the update function. In this paper, the communicative
act is denoted by an utterance with certain features (and propositional content).
The felicity conditions follow by default from the utterance and, from this, a
hearer can infer the attitudes which are responsible for the performance of the
CA. Bunt's update function would follow from the closure of the axioms and
default rules. Note that both views can lead to the same inferences, since in both
cases it was derived that the agents mutually believe that the felicity conditions
hold. In our case this is explicitly achieved by means of the observability axiom.
The framework presented here differs slightly from Perrault (1989) too. Perrault's
default rules on intention explicitly state that actions are performed intentionally
(30) and that if the utterance of a simple declarative is performed intentionally,
the speaker believes the content of the utterance (31):
(30) DOs,ta ~ Is,tDOs,ta
(31) Is,tDOs,t(c dec, nil, nil, p)) ~ Bs,tP
In our case, however, from uttering a declarative it can be inferred that the
speaker had the intention that the hearer would believe that p is true (32) and
from the quality maxim the speaker's belief that p can be derived (33):
(32) DOs t(c dec, nil, nil, p~) ~ Is,tBH,ttiP
(33) Is,tBx,ttiP ~ Bs,tP
The difference, we think, comes mainly from a different view on the intention
operator. In this paper, the operator expresses a certain state the speaker wants
to achieve: "The speaker intends to make p true" . From the decision by the
speaker that a certain state should be reached it follows that the speaker is
committed to do certain actions, and every action poses its own problema. For
instance, if the speaker intends the hearer to believe that p is true, the speaker
may decide to perform intentionally a declarative with content p. This commits
the speaker to formulate a certain sentence and to do so a speaker should pick up
a pen or open his mouth, etc. In other words, a great deal of intended, parallel
and sequential actions are involved to achíeve the primary intention.
In this paper, we also left out Perrault's closure rule for intention, i.e:
(34) Ix,tP~Bx,t(P ~ 9) ~ Iz,t9
The reason for this is given in Cohen 8c Levesque ( 1989a): an agent who decides
to get his tooth filled and believes that the dentist's action will cause pain, may
surely deny that he intends to be in a state of having pain. In other words,
the agent need not intend all the expected side-effects of his intentions. In our
proposal, we have opted for a weaker form of the consequence ( i.e., ~Ix,t~q), and
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from this it follows that intentions are always consistent.
The advantage using a non-monotonic system is that inferencea can be drawn
without complete knowledge of the actual state of affairs. Here, the particular
choice of the non-monotonic system (Reiter's (1980) default logic) is rather arbi-
trary; one might as well choose other systems like Moore's (1985) autoepestemic
logic or Appelt and Konolige's (1988) hierarchic autoepistemic logic. The latter
is more complex and probably too powerful for our case, since non-monotonic
rules like P(a) ~~F(a) and B(a) ~ F(a) can be given different priorities,
which is imposaible in our framework and which seems unnecessary. In our pro-
posal, priority is achieved by means of a dependency between the consequent of
the preferred rule and the prerequisite of a less preferred rule and thus explicitly
built into the rules themselves. In Appelt 8c Konolige's system the hierarchy is
stipulated outaide the rules.
In some cases, building in rules of priority can be problematic. Here, we have
decided to give priority to the direct use of declaratives and interrogatives as
statements and questions, respectively, but one should be aware that in different
situations different priorities could be in force. Ambiguities, on the other hand,
can simply be incorporated as disjunctions into the consequenta of the default
rules. Later on, one might hope, the disjuncts can be disambiguated if more
knowledge becomes available in the course of the dialogue. It is unacceptable,
however, for a system to generate a question interpretation of a declarative on the
same level as a statement interpretation simply because both interpretations are
possible. Therefore, we have avoided ambiguity by the priority of certain default
rules. An advantage is that not all interpretations have to be calculated before
one is selected.
This brings us to another subject, namely the use of indirections. Usually, indi-
rect speech acts are inferred from the direct one and added to the direct one. For
example, a declarative question has the direct force of a statement and the indi-
rect force of a question. The literal force hypothesis (LFH) (see Gazdar (1981))
is fully based on the use of explicit performatives and sentence type, as if no
other sentence feature, such as particles and intonation, would influence the de-
termination of a speech act type. Our theory can be conaidered as an extended
veraion of the literal force hypothesis, except that the literal force is not cal-
culated whenever evidence exista to the contrary. Note also that if in the case
of LFH a statement is counted as a direct interpretation with a question as an
indirect interpretation, both interpretations could lead to contradictory resulta
if they were treated `on the same level'. For instance, on the basis of ISBHp we
may infer that the apeaker believes that p; on the basia of I3BHISBsp, however,
we may infer that the speaker does not believe that p.
Aa we have aeen, contextual knowledge may influence the choice of a certain
interpretation. In our theory a declarative was interpreted by the hearer as a
queetion becauae speaker and hearer mutually believed that the hearer was the
expert on the topic, although no information about the queation function waa
available in the utterance itself. This agrees nicely with the resulta obtained
from our experimental and empirical studies of natural dialogues (Beun (1988b)
and Beun (1989)) where 50q of the declarative queationa have no overt queation
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indicator.
Another result to be mentioned is that the difference between illocutionary and
perlocutionary effects becomes indistinct. Levinson (1983) describes illocution-
ary acts as "what is directly achieved by the conventional force associated with
the issuance of a certain kind of utterance in accord with a conventional proce-
dure. In contrast, a perlocutionary act is apecific to the circumstances of isauance
... and includes all those effects that some particular utterance in some partic-
ular situation may cause" (pp. 237). Here the ilIocutionary act is replaced by
uttering a sentence with particular characteristics, and disconnected from the
performative verbs. Both the illocutionary act and the utterance of a aentence
with particular characteristics can only be performed if a speaker fulfills certain
conditions. Hence, the performance of an illocutionary act is also specific to the
circumstances of the utterance, just as perlocutionary acts are. Clearly, an illocu-
tionary act should be described from a speaker's point of view. Recognition of the
act by the recipient in terms of performative verbs is unnecessary for determining
the relevant aspects of the speaker's mental state. A recipient has to know how
the utterance features can be related to a package of felicity conditiona. Since all
effects are contextually dependent on what the hearer thinks about the world,
about the speaker, and so on, it can be argued that all effects are perlocutionary.
6.7 Conclusion
In this paper, the performance of an utterance is taken as a communicative act
to influence certain aspects of the mental state of a hearer. To describe the ef-
fects that result from the act, communicative acts were expressed in terms of the
linguistic features of the utterance and, by means of default rules, directly con-
nected to the felicity conditions of the act. The felicity conditions were expressed
in terms of the speaker's intentions and beliefs that must be present before the act
can be performed. Successful communication is accomplished if a hearer recog-
nizes the felicity conditions from the speaker's act, which occurs when the hearer
observes the speaker and knows the conventional relation between the utterance
features and its felicity conditions.
Default rules were used to build in contextual dependency of the interpretation
of the act and to let the agent draw inferences without complete knowledge of
the aituation. To indicate that a particular interpretation of a communicative
act has a preference in most situations, default rules were hierarchically ordered.
To simplify the felicity conditions that are transferred by a particular com-
municative act, aspects of rationality and cooperation were axiomatized in terms
of beliefs and intentions of an agent. Pragmatic principles, such as the Gricean
maxim of quality, were expressed in default rules, so that contextual dependency
could beincorporated.
An advantage of our approach is that speech acts can be viewed as actions in
general, intentionally performed with the aim of changing a certain atate (here,
the mental state of the dialogue participants). In this respect, the agent's inten-
tions may be viewed as his commitment to achieve another state by performing
a particular action.
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There is still a great deal to be done, however. Some of the axioms are over-
simplified and in most cases particles and intonation can hardly be interpreted
in matters of belief and intention only. Also, the addition of temporal or sequen-
tial aspects cannot be avoided in a framework of actions. The most important
problem to be solved, we think, is the determination of the primary intention of
the speaker, since in the formalism this intention is hidden in an infinite amount
of intentions and beliefs that result from the closure of the axioms and default




The central goal in this thesis was to understand how a declarative can be recog-
nized to have a question function and to identify the information that is commu-
nicated by a declarative question (DQ~. Let us first summarize the main results
and subsequently indicate some limitations of the research.
7.1 Main findings
In spoken information dialogues, almost 20~ of the questions is uttered with a
declarative sentence type instead of an interrogative one. To indicate the question
function of the declarative, a speaker may add two types of indicators to the
utterance: prosodic and textual indicators. An important prosodic indicator is a
rise in intonation at the end of the utterance. However, since only half of the DQs
possesses a rising intonation, the indicator is insufl'icient to identify all DQs. If a
rising intonation is absent, the indicators may come from textual characteriatics.
Textual question indicators can be divided into two categories:
1. indicators determining that the hearer is the expert on the topic of the
utterance.
2. indicators expressing conflicting beliefs between the hearer and apeaker,
and~or surprise on the part of the speaker about the proposition involved.
Although these indicators may provide strong evidence that the declarative is a
question, none is decisive. In all cases the indicators can be overruled by the
circumstances of the utterance.
In using a declarative as a question, speakers often indicate that they have
a supposition or weak belief about the content of the utterance. This belief
may emanate from the discourse itself, from contextual information outside the
dialogue, or both. A declarative form is preferred if the information about the
content has been literally provided in the dialogue or if the information can be
derived by implication; preference decreases if the information is derivable from
conversational principles. An interrogative form is preferred if no information
about the content is provided in the preceding discourse. The use of declarativea
correlates with the certainty of the speaker about the content, although it cannot
be concluded that a strong supposition automatically causes a declarative form
and a weak or no supposition an interrogative form. The use of declaratives
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decreases when topical shifts or changes occur; moreover, for reasons of politeness
it happens that a declarative is used even when there is hardly any evidence about
the content.
We have argued that a DQ without prosodic and textual question indicators
does not have to be interpreted as an indirect use of a statement, but rather as a
choice for a less preferred interpretation induced by contextual knowledge. Beliefs
and intentions of the speaker were derived directly from the linguistic features of
the utterance and not through the determination of an illocutionary force.
7.2 Limitations and future research
Prosodics
Our data used in the experiments in chapter 3 were limited to utterances with-
out a final rise. Although a final rise in Dutch strongly indicates the question
function of a declarative, it is still indefinite whether it is sufficient to conclude
that the declarative is used as a question. Geluykens (1987) already showed that
English utterances in isolation with a final rise are not always interpreted as
questions. A major problem in his results is, however, that he used intonation
patterns that were synthesized and we are ignorant about the correspondence of
these patterns and perceptually relevant patterns in natural dialogues. A solution
to this problem could be to investigate all utterances with a final rise in a repre-
sentative corpus of dialogues and see whether they function as questions. We did
not investigate this systematically, but it appears intuitively obvious that, apart
from the DQs, other utterances occur with a final rise. In that case, it should be
investigated whether a combination of other characteristics, such as declination
and accentuation, may distinguish DQs from other utterances. Another point of
investigation might be the slope of the final rise in DQs, which is probably dif-
ferent from that in other utterances. An indication that other relevant prosodic
features are present as well follows from the experimental results in chapters 3
and 4. From Figure 3.2 we have concluded that a substantial part of the utter-
ances without textual indicators and without a rising intonation is interpreted
as questions. In chapter 4 only a small part of the utterances without textual
indicators was identified as questions (Figure 4.2). So, since contextual indicators
were absent in these experiments, other prosodic indicators than a rising intona-
tion must be involved.
Particles
Although particles are wídely used in spoken dialogues,i until recently their se-
mantic descriptions have almost completely been neglected by linguists. One of
the reasons was a lack of tools to account for a satisfactory description (see e.g.,
Wierzbicka (1986)). To describe the semantics of the particles in this thesis, we
haved used a framework of belief and intention, with ordered default rules to
express the shift of the subjects' preference between a statement and a question
interpretation. It should be noted, though, that our semantic descriptions are
considerably limited and that we have concentrated on a few particles only. It is
`In contrast with other languages such as Dutcli, German and Russian, the role of
particles in English is ratlier modest.
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to be expected that a more detailed treatment and further experiments would ex-
plain why some of these particles support a question interpretation. Undoubtedly,
concepts like topical development, dialogue structure, distribution of knowledge,
etc., ahould be incorporated in the analysis; also a more sophisticated treatment
of temporal aspects should be undertaken. For instance, it was found that sen-
tences with particles that express conflicting beliefs are more often interpreted
as questions. If agents act rationally and cooperatively, then they will avoid
contradictions and conflicts, and try to determine the reason for contradicting
propositiona in order to solve a conflict. Hence, conflicting beliefs evoke `spe-
cial' reaponses and therefore the particles under consideration may have a more
question-like interpretation.
The type of dialogue
Another restriction is that we have concentrated on a small part of language use:
the use of utterances in Dutch informative telephone dialogues. The restriction
to information dialogues prevents us from modelling, for instance, social atatus or
emotion, and the restriction to telephone dialogues excludes non-verbal aspecta of
communication. It is to be expected that, in face to face dialogues, geaticulation,
facial expressions, and eye and body movement will play an important role in the
identification of intentions and beliefs. We have avoided this for obvious reasons;
the multimodal aspect would have increased the complexity of the dialogue dra-
matically. Moreover, it is not likely that computers will be able to perceive and
recognize auch behaviour in the near future.
The function of declarative questions
In this thesis it was found that speakers often use a declarative for questioning if
they have a weak belief about the content. But, if a speaker wants to know the
answer, why then does he also want to express such a belief? In other words, what
effect do speakers want to have on the hearer's mental state by expressing their
weak belief? In chapter 5, it was found that DQ's are often used when the infor-
mation is literally provided in the dialogue or can be derived by implication or
implicature from one or more previous utterances. This implies that the speaker
is aware that the hearer knows that the speaker has evidence about the content
of the DQ. So, if speakers do not express this evidence, they give the impresaion
that relevant parts of the discourse were not well understood. Note also that in
normal circumstances it is considered inattentive to repeat the same question in
an interrogative form if the question was already answered. So, although it was
argued that the Gricean maxim of quantity was exploited by using a DQ (e.g.,
chapter 5: `the hearer already knows the content of the utterance'), the maxim
seems to be adhered to at some deeper level to prevent the hearer from thinking
that certain parts of the discourse were misunderstood. In this reapect, the DQ
seema to fulfill the control function of an acknowledgement.
7.3 Concluding remarks
In this thesis we have used empirical and experimental results to support a bet-
ter understanding of certain speech acts. With that, we have attempted to con-
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tribute to a more integrative theory of natural language understanding based
on an analysis of what people actually do in conversations and on results from
philosophically and computationally oriented traditions. It is our opinion that
conversational analysis and speech act theory should be seen as supplementary
rather than competing approaches to discourse processing. To make accurate
observationa posaible, we also believe that the two disciplines cannot do without
controlled experiments; in this respect, our experimental results may be conceived
as an intermediary between the two approaches.
We do not believe that a well-founded semantic description of illocutionary
acts constitutea a goal in language underatanding. This is motivated by the re-
sults from chapter 6 where linguistic characteristics of the utterance were mapped
directly on an intentional framework, and where illocutionary categorization was
omitted because it was superfluous. As far as conversational structure is con-
cerned, it is our opinion that speech act theory mainly contributes to the idea
that language uae can be conceived as the performance of actions, and therefore
should be considered part of a more general theory of planning and acting.
Clearly, a lot remains to be done. For instance, in the theoretical framework
sketched in chapter 6, the conception of time as subsequent states precludes
the representation of continuous and parallel events. Also, the framework doea
not explain why people are committed to achieve a certain state, and alao we
are unable to express the strength of the agent's commitment and belief.2 It is
readily agreed that auch aspects should be included in a model of natural language
underatanding, but this would have far-reaching consequences from a formal and
computational point of view.
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Summary
This thesis presents a study concerning the identification in dialogues of ques-
tions with a declarative sentence type (DQs). The type of dialogue is restricted to
information dialogues, i.e. dialogues with the sole purpose of transferring factual
information.
In chapter 2 a general introduction is given on the identification of commu-
nicative acts and speech acts in particular. Speech acts are considered as a special
instance of communicative acts, namely those acts that are intentionally meant
to transfer certain linguistic information.
In previous experiments telephone dialogues were recorded between an in-
formant from Amsterdam airport and an information seeker. It was found that
almost 20q of the questions possessed the syntactic form of a declarative. Half
of these utterances had a rising intonation in the end as a question indicator.
To recover other (prosodic or textual) indicators in the utterances three exper-
iments were carried out in which subjects had to determine the question function
from utterances in isolation. In chapter 3, two experiments are described where
the utterances were presented on tape; in chapter 4, an experiment is described
where the utterances were presented on screen.
The first experiment described in chapter 3 was an exploratory investiga-
tion to find out the main question indicators in spoken DQs. DQs and answers
were isolated from the original dialogues and presented to the subjects on tape.
The subjects' task was divided into two parts: in one part they had to indicate
whether the utterance was a question or not, in the other they had to indicate
whether the utterance was an answer or not. It was found that subjects mainly
indicated a question function when the utterance contained particles such as en
(anc~, dus (so) and ook (also). The second experiment was carried out to verify
whether these particles or (unknown) prosodic features contributed to a question
interpretation. Potential linguistic indicators were removed from the utterances
which were presented to the subjects together with the original utterances. The
task of the subjects was identical to the first experiment. As a result, it followed
that the removal of the particles en and oh at the beginning of the utterance,
and the particle dus significantly influenced the responses of the subjects. Ut-
terances that contained these particles were more often interpreted as questions
than utterances without.
A shortcoming was that the removal of linguistic indicators had the conse-
quence of cutting out both textual and prosodic aspects. To eliminate prosodic
characteristics and to concentrate on textual indicators only, an experiment is
described in chapter 4 where subjects had to indicate the question function from
utterances presented on screen. The task of the subjects was identical with the
task in the previous experiments. It was found that two types of indicators were
important in the interpretation of a declarative as a question. Firstly, indica-
tors that determine that the hearer is the expert on the topic of the utterance
and, secondly, indicators that express conflicting beliefs between the hearer and
the speaker and~or surprise of the speaker about a stated proposition. Since,
the results were similar to the results in the experiments described in chapter
3, it seemed to be the case that, apart from a rising intonation in the end of
the utterance, prosodic indicators play only a limited role in the recognition of a
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declarative as a question.
In chapter 5 it was investigated what contextual features contributed to the
use of a declarative as a syntactic form of a question instead of an interrogative
form. Two experiments were carried out in which dialogues, taken from the
earlier recorded dialogues, were presented to subjects in printed form. In the
first experiment, the preference of subjects was tested for a declarative form or
an interrogative one. In the second experiment, subjects had to indicate the
degree of certainty of the speaker about the proposition stated in the declarative.
Information with respect to the semantic content of the utterance was built into
the dialogues in three ways: 1. the information was literally provided in the
previous discourse or could be derived by implication from previous utterances,
2. information could be derived from the Gricean principle of cooperation, and 3.
the information was not available or could only be derived from already existing
world knowledge. It was found that the use of declarative questions was high
in the first case and decreased in the second and the third. The same result
was found for the certainty about the content of the declarative. Moreover, the
outcome was also influenced by an abrupt topic change of the utterance and by
rules of politeness. In most cases, however, where a declarative form is used for
questioning, a speaker wants to express a weak belief about the content of the
declarative and uses this form to verify a certain statement. It is discussed that
in some cases the inference to derive a certain belief is complex, but this is of no
concern to the hearer. A hearer has to identify only the question function of the
declarative and may take the belief of the speaker for granted.
In chapter 6 a theoretical framework was sketched to identify relevant parts
of a speaker's mental state, in terms of beliefs and intentions, from the linguis-
tic features of the utterance. For that, communicative acts were considered as
functions that change one context into another and were expressed in observ-
able features of the utterance, such as `declarative', `rising intonation', etc. The
features of the utterance were directly linked to the necessary conditiona (fe-
licity conditions~ to perform a certain act. This connection was accomplished
by means of default rules, which were hierarchically ordered. The introduction
of default rules offered a possibility to include contextual dependency without
knowing all the facts. Moreover, by means of the hierarchical order certain indi-
rect speech acts can be considered as a choice for a less preferred set of felicity
conditions and other, more preferred sets, can be rejected beforehand on con-
textual grounds. The framework opens up a possibility to interpret declaratives,
without any other indicators, as questions instead of statements. In those cases,
evidence must be found that the statement interpretation conflicts with previous
contextual knowledge; for instance, when the hearer knows that it is mutually
known that the hearer is the expert on the topic of the utterance. The theoret-
ical framework was developed in such a way that many of the results from the
experiments could be incorporated qualitatively.
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